Artwork

内容由checonomics提供。所有播客内容(包括剧集、图形和播客描述)均由 checonomics 或其播客平台合作伙伴直接上传和提供。如果您认为有人在未经您许可的情况下使用您的受版权保护的作品,您可以按照此处概述的流程进行操作https://zh.player.fm/legal
Player FM -播客应用
使用Player FM应用程序离线!

A3W 美元泥沼 23Q - 补充阅读附全文 - OTD - Subprime 次贷危机名家观点2

5:18
 
分享
 

已归档的系列专辑 ("不活跃的收取点" status)

When? This feed was archived on August 01, 2022 20:16 (1+ y ago). Last successful fetch was on April 03, 2021 22:07 (3y ago)

Why? 不活跃的收取点 status. 我们的伺服器已尝试了一段时间,但仍然无法截取有效的播客收取点

What now? You might be able to find a more up-to-date version using the search function. This series will no longer be checked for updates. If you believe this to be in error, please check if the publisher's feed link below is valid and contact support to request the feed be restored or if you have any other concerns about this.

Manage episode 222714413 series 2467225
内容由checonomics提供。所有播客内容(包括剧集、图形和播客描述)均由 checonomics 或其播客平台合作伙伴直接上传和提供。如果您认为有人在未经您许可的情况下使用您的受版权保护的作品,您可以按照此处概述的流程进行操作https://zh.player.fm/legal
THE FAILURE OF THE LEADERSHIP

During this housing boom, most of our authorities simply denied there was a problem. Alan Greenspan, in his 2007 book The Age of Turbulence, recalled what he used to say about the housing boom: "I would tell audiences that we were facing not a bubble but a froth, lots of small local bubbles that never grew to a scale that could threaten the health of the overall economy."

Ben Bernanke, then chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, said in 2005: "House prices have risen by nearly 25 percent over the past two years. Although speculative activity has increased in some areas, at a national level these price increases largely reflect strong economic fundamentals, including robust growth in jobs and incomes, low mortgage rates, steady rates of household formation, and factors that limit the expansion of housing supply in some areas.".

These people were certainly aware of the possibility of bubbles. Indeed Greenspan must have been thinking of this when I and my colleague John Campbell, along with others, were asked to testify before the Federal Reserve Board on December 3, 1996, two days before Greenspan made his famous "irrational exuberance" speech. He heard us out. His autobiography reveals that he was wrestling with the idea of bubbles. But he concluded, as did so many others, that bubbles were not tangible enough to justify any policy changes.

Something was going on, in both the stock market bubble of the 1990s and the real estate bubble that followed it, that these leaders found very difficult to see as it was happening. So it will necessarily be something of a challenge for us to understand what it was.

Greenspan thus did eventually acknowledge the obvious reality of bubbles, but he never seemed to embrace the view that a good part of what drives people’s thinking is purely social in nature. He espoused the idea that the mathematical econometric models of individual behavior are the only tools that we will ever have with which to understand the world, and that they are limited only by the amount and nature of our data and our ability to deal with complexity. He does not seem to respect research approaches from the fields of psychology or sociology.

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

Understanding such a social contagion is a lot like understanding a disease epidemic. Epidemics crop up from time to time, and their timing often baffles experts. But a mathematical theory of epidemiology has been developed, and it can help medical authorities better understand these apparently mysterious events.

Every disease has a contagion rate and a removal rate. If the contagion rate exceeds the removal rate by a necessary amount, an epidemic begins. So it is in the economic and social environment. Sooner or later, some factor boosts the infection rate sufficiently above the removal rate for an optimistic view of the market to become widespread. There is an escalation in public knowledge of the arguments that would seem to support that view, and soon the epidemic spirals up and out of control. Almost everyone appears to think, if they notice at all that certain economic arguments are more in evidence, that the arguments are increasingly heard only because of their true intellectual merit. The idea that the prominence of the arguments is in fact due to a social contagion is hardly ever broached, at least not outside university sociology departments.

The feedback loops also take the form of price, economic activity, price again. Speculative price increases encourage genuine economic optimism, hence more spending, hence greater economic growth, hence yet more optimism, hence further bidding up of prices. Most people can be forgiven for not seeing that the sense of economic prosperity that usually attends a major speculative bubble is actually caused by the bubble itself and not by economic fundamentals.

The problem is that we can arrive at a situation in which people are generally adopting an excessively optimistic view or excessively pessimistic view, because they are rationally but mistakenly judging the information that others have. To borrow a term used by other economic theorists, speculative bubbles may be caused by "information cascades." An information cascade occurs when those in a group disregard their own independent, individually collected information, which might otherwise encourage them not to subscribe to a boom or other mass belief, because they feel that everyone else simply couldn’t be wrong. And when they disregard their own independent information, and act instead on general information as they perceive it, they squelch their own information. It is no longer available to the group and so does not figure in further collective judgments. Thus, over time, the quality of group information declines.

Psychological, epidemiological, and economic theory all point to an environment in which feedback of enthusiasm for speculative assets, or feedback of price increases into further price increases, can be expected to produce speculative bubbles from time to time. They make clear that these bubbles can have complicated, sometimes random and unpredictable, dynamics.

The interpretation of the bubble that I have just offered is not the conventional wisdom. Other factors are widely cited as the cause of the housing boom. I argue here that, to a large extent, these other factors were themselves substantially a product of the bubble, and not exogenous factors that caused the bubble.

  continue reading

284集单集

Artwork
icon分享
 

已归档的系列专辑 ("不活跃的收取点" status)

When? This feed was archived on August 01, 2022 20:16 (1+ y ago). Last successful fetch was on April 03, 2021 22:07 (3y ago)

Why? 不活跃的收取点 status. 我们的伺服器已尝试了一段时间,但仍然无法截取有效的播客收取点

What now? You might be able to find a more up-to-date version using the search function. This series will no longer be checked for updates. If you believe this to be in error, please check if the publisher's feed link below is valid and contact support to request the feed be restored or if you have any other concerns about this.

Manage episode 222714413 series 2467225
内容由checonomics提供。所有播客内容(包括剧集、图形和播客描述)均由 checonomics 或其播客平台合作伙伴直接上传和提供。如果您认为有人在未经您许可的情况下使用您的受版权保护的作品,您可以按照此处概述的流程进行操作https://zh.player.fm/legal
THE FAILURE OF THE LEADERSHIP

During this housing boom, most of our authorities simply denied there was a problem. Alan Greenspan, in his 2007 book The Age of Turbulence, recalled what he used to say about the housing boom: "I would tell audiences that we were facing not a bubble but a froth, lots of small local bubbles that never grew to a scale that could threaten the health of the overall economy."

Ben Bernanke, then chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, said in 2005: "House prices have risen by nearly 25 percent over the past two years. Although speculative activity has increased in some areas, at a national level these price increases largely reflect strong economic fundamentals, including robust growth in jobs and incomes, low mortgage rates, steady rates of household formation, and factors that limit the expansion of housing supply in some areas.".

These people were certainly aware of the possibility of bubbles. Indeed Greenspan must have been thinking of this when I and my colleague John Campbell, along with others, were asked to testify before the Federal Reserve Board on December 3, 1996, two days before Greenspan made his famous "irrational exuberance" speech. He heard us out. His autobiography reveals that he was wrestling with the idea of bubbles. But he concluded, as did so many others, that bubbles were not tangible enough to justify any policy changes.

Something was going on, in both the stock market bubble of the 1990s and the real estate bubble that followed it, that these leaders found very difficult to see as it was happening. So it will necessarily be something of a challenge for us to understand what it was.

Greenspan thus did eventually acknowledge the obvious reality of bubbles, but he never seemed to embrace the view that a good part of what drives people’s thinking is purely social in nature. He espoused the idea that the mathematical econometric models of individual behavior are the only tools that we will ever have with which to understand the world, and that they are limited only by the amount and nature of our data and our ability to deal with complexity. He does not seem to respect research approaches from the fields of psychology or sociology.

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

Understanding such a social contagion is a lot like understanding a disease epidemic. Epidemics crop up from time to time, and their timing often baffles experts. But a mathematical theory of epidemiology has been developed, and it can help medical authorities better understand these apparently mysterious events.

Every disease has a contagion rate and a removal rate. If the contagion rate exceeds the removal rate by a necessary amount, an epidemic begins. So it is in the economic and social environment. Sooner or later, some factor boosts the infection rate sufficiently above the removal rate for an optimistic view of the market to become widespread. There is an escalation in public knowledge of the arguments that would seem to support that view, and soon the epidemic spirals up and out of control. Almost everyone appears to think, if they notice at all that certain economic arguments are more in evidence, that the arguments are increasingly heard only because of their true intellectual merit. The idea that the prominence of the arguments is in fact due to a social contagion is hardly ever broached, at least not outside university sociology departments.

The feedback loops also take the form of price, economic activity, price again. Speculative price increases encourage genuine economic optimism, hence more spending, hence greater economic growth, hence yet more optimism, hence further bidding up of prices. Most people can be forgiven for not seeing that the sense of economic prosperity that usually attends a major speculative bubble is actually caused by the bubble itself and not by economic fundamentals.

The problem is that we can arrive at a situation in which people are generally adopting an excessively optimistic view or excessively pessimistic view, because they are rationally but mistakenly judging the information that others have. To borrow a term used by other economic theorists, speculative bubbles may be caused by "information cascades." An information cascade occurs when those in a group disregard their own independent, individually collected information, which might otherwise encourage them not to subscribe to a boom or other mass belief, because they feel that everyone else simply couldn’t be wrong. And when they disregard their own independent information, and act instead on general information as they perceive it, they squelch their own information. It is no longer available to the group and so does not figure in further collective judgments. Thus, over time, the quality of group information declines.

Psychological, epidemiological, and economic theory all point to an environment in which feedback of enthusiasm for speculative assets, or feedback of price increases into further price increases, can be expected to produce speculative bubbles from time to time. They make clear that these bubbles can have complicated, sometimes random and unpredictable, dynamics.

The interpretation of the bubble that I have just offered is not the conventional wisdom. Other factors are widely cited as the cause of the housing boom. I argue here that, to a large extent, these other factors were themselves substantially a product of the bubble, and not exogenous factors that caused the bubble.

  continue reading

284集单集

所有剧集

×
 
Loading …

欢迎使用Player FM

Player FM正在网上搜索高质量的播客,以便您现在享受。它是最好的播客应用程序,适用于安卓、iPhone和网络。注册以跨设备同步订阅。

 

快速参考指南