外交官的國際新聞導覽及中東中亞的歷史故事 Diplomat's daily news review and history research on Middle East and Central Asia
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與來自以色列、阿聯酋、巴林和摩洛哥的國務卿安東尼·布林肯 (Antony Blinken) 的同行舉行的活動是拜登政府首次接受亞伯拉罕協議。
2021 年 9 月 17 日 18:18
2021 年 7 月 28 日，美國國務卿安東尼·布林肯和印度外交部長蘇布拉馬尼亞姆·賈尚卡爾在印度新德里的賈瓦哈拉爾·尼赫魯·巴萬 (JNB) 舉行聯合新聞發布會
此次活動 - 與來自以色列、阿拉伯聯合酋長國、巴林和摩洛哥的Blinken 同行舉行- 是拜登政府對所謂的亞伯拉罕協議的最高調擁抱，該協議被廣泛視為共和黨前總統川普的外交成功.
自 1 月上任以來，民主黨總統喬·拜登 (Joe Biden) 一直支持這些交易，高級助手錶示，他們希望更多的阿拉伯國家在數十年的敵意後與以色列實現關係正常化。但迄今為止，政府一直對紀念協議週年的想法保持冷靜。
2020 年 9 月在白宮舉行的亞伯拉罕協議簽署儀式。（來源：TOM BRENNER/REUTERS）
以色列外交部長 Yair Lapid 表示同意，他說：“這個亞伯拉罕協議俱樂部也對新成員開放。”
去年 9 月，以色列、阿聯酋和巴林的領導人在白宮簽署了這些協議。在拜登在美國大選中擊敗特朗普之後，以色列和蘇丹在接下來的一個月宣布他們將實現關係正常化，摩洛哥於 12 月與以色列建立了外交關係。
Blinken: US will help foster further Israeli ties with Arab states
The event held with Secretary of State Antony Blinken's counterparts from Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and Morrocco was the first of the Biden administration's embrace of the Abraham Accords.
SEPTEMBER 17, 2021 18:18
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and India's Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar hold a joint news conference at Jawaharlal Nehru Bhawan (JNB) in New Delhi, India July 28, 2021
(photo credit: REUTERS)
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken pledged on Friday to encourage more Arab countries to normalize relations with Israel as he hosted a virtual meeting with Israeli and Arab counterparts to mark the first anniversary of a set of landmark diplomatic agreements.
The event - held with Blinken’s counterparts from Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco - was the Biden administration’s highest-profile embrace of the so-called Abraham Accords, which were widely seen as a diplomatic success for Republican former President Donald Trump.
Democratic President Joe Biden has backed the deals since taking office in January, and senior aides have said they want more Arab countries to normalize relations with Israel after decades of enmity. But the administration until now had been cool to the idea of commemorating the anniversary of the accords.
On Friday, however, Blinken hailed their diplomatic and economic benefits, saying: “This administration will continue to build on the successful efforts of the last administration to keep normalization marching forward.”
He said the Biden administration would help foster Israel’s growing ties with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco - as well as Sudan, which also reached a breakthrough with Israel last year – and would work to deepen Israel’s relationships with Egypt and Jordan, which have long-standing peace deals.
THE SIGNING CEREMONY for the Abraham Accords at the White House in September 2020. (credit: TOM BRENNER/REUTERS)
And Blinken said Washington would encourage more countries to follow their lead. “We want to widen the circle of peaceful diplomacy,” he said.
Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid agreed, saying: “This Abraham Accords club is open to new members as well.”
The leaders of Israel, the UAE and Bahrain signed the accords at the White House last September. Israel and Sudan announced in the following month that they would normalize relations, and Morocco established diplomatic ties with Israel in December, after Biden defeated Trump in the U.S. election.
Palestinian officials said they felt betrayed by their Arab brethren for reaching deals with Israel without first demanding progress toward the creation of a Palestinian state.
Some critics said Trump had promoted Arab rapprochement with Israel while ignoring Palestinian aspirations for statehood.
But Blinken, who has sought to repair ties with the Palestinians badly damaged under Trump, said: “We all must build on these relationships and growing normalization to make tangible improvements in the lives of Palestinians, and to make progress toward the long-standing goal of advancing negotiated peace between Israelis and Palestinians.”
2021 年 9 月 17 日 15:46
埃及總統阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西呼籲恢復以巴會談，在本週與巴林國王哈馬德·本·伊薩·阿勒哈利法會面後，該會談自 2014 年以來一直被凍結。
塞西還一直在與有關參與者舉行會談，討論需要恢復以巴會談，以根據 1967 年之前的路線解決衝突。
2021 年 9 月 2 日，埃及總統阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西 (C) 與巴勒斯坦總統馬哈茂德·阿巴斯 (R) 和約旦國王阿卜杜拉二世在聯合國大會之前在埃及開羅伊蒂哈迪亞總統府會晤前合影（圖片來源：路透社）
Sisi calls for Israeli-Palestinian talks after meeting Bahraini King
Egypt is attempting to broker indirect talks between Israel and Hamas that would lead to a permanent ceasefire over Gaza.
SEPTEMBER 17, 2021 15:46
ABDEL FATTAH AL-SISI
(photo credit: VASILY FEDOSENKO / REUTERS)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi called for the resumption of Israel-Palestinian talks, which have been frozen since 2014 after he met this week with Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa.
"The two sides confirmed the importance of working .. to intensify international efforts to break the stalemate in the peace process and resume negotiations so as to resolve the Palestinian crisis based on international legitimacy resolutions," Sisi's office said in a statement about Wednesday's meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh.
"The Bahraini King lauded Egypt’s recent endeavors in this file at the highest level, its tireless efforts to firm up the ceasefire between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and its initiative for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip," Sisi's office said.
Egypt is attempting to broker indirect talks between Israel and Hamas that would lead to a permanent ceasefire over Gaza.
Sisi has also been holding talks with relevant players on the need to resume Israeli-Palestinian talks toward a two-state resolution to the conflict based on the pre-1967 lines.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (C) poses with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (R) and Jordan's King Abdullah II before their meeting ahead of the UN general assembly at the Ittihadiya presidential palace in Cairo, Egypt, September 2, 2021 (credit: REUTERS)
At the start of September, Sisi met with Jordan's King Abdullah and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. At that meeting, Abbas stressed the importance of a peace process brokered by the Quartet rather than the United States, which has been in charge of the process for over four decades. The Quartet is composed of the United Nations, the European Union, Russia, and the US.
Earlier this week Sisi met with Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and spoke about the need for talks.
Sisi office said that at the meeting with Bennett the president confirmed that "Egypt supports all efforts exerted to achieve comprehensive peace in the Middle East, based on the two-state solution." He added that this "contributes to reinforcing security and achieving prosperity for all peoples of the region."
After the meeting, Bennett told Israeli media that he is opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state and has no interest in meeting Abbas.
US President Joe Biden has spoken of the importance of a two-state resolution to the conflict but has not put forward any plan to achieve Palestinian statehood.
On Wednesday State Department spokesman Ned Price said that the US has not "explicitly" called for Israeli-Palestinian talks at this time.
2021 年 9 月 17 日 11:55
2013 年，一名巴勒斯坦抗議者舉著標語牌，標語牌描繪了南非前總統納爾遜·曼德拉 (Nelson Mandela) 在反對約旦河西岸 Bil'in 村附近定居點的示威活動，背景是安全屏障。
（信息來源：MOHAMAD TOROKMAN /路透社）
貝內特繼續向哈馬斯領導人和加沙人民發出威脅，稱他們對以色列進行任何形式的抗議——無論是在邊境示威還是對士兵或平民使用武器。貝內特從未就以色列與約旦河西岸超過 300 萬巴勒斯坦人之間的長期關係提出任何一致的以色列戰略。
納夫塔利·貝內特總理在 2021 年 8 月的每週內閣會議上與外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德交談（圖片來源：RONEN ZVULUN/REUTERS）
本應在不到兩年的時間內接替貝內特擔任總理的外長亞伊爾·拉皮德 (Yair Lapid) 週日概述了以色列與加沙關係的“新願景”，稱以色列“必須朝著加沙經濟發展的多年進程邁進”。安全回歸”，並進一步表示，此舉的目的是“在邊界兩側創造穩定”。拉皮德證實了政府的立場，“這裡提出的解決方案並不涉及兩國解決方案，但我對此事的看法是眾所周知的：以色列需要採取行動加強巴勒斯坦權力機構並與它進行有目的的談判。實現兩國解決方案。”
拉皮德在政府中並不孤單，還有梅雷茨和工黨支持兩國解決方案，而吉迪恩·薩爾的蒂克瓦·哈達沙（新希望）完全拒絕建立巴勒斯坦國，財政部長阿維格多·利伯曼表示在不同時期就這個問題發表了不同的意見。我認為我們不確定 Mansour Abbas 和 [阿拉伯聯合名單] Ra'am Party 在建立巴勒斯坦國方面的立場，或者更多，他們對以色列成為民主民族國家的立場的猶太人，因為他們並沒有真正處理更廣泛的以巴衝突。
A US step to save the two-state solution for Israel and Palestinians
US recognition of a Palestinian state is a step that could shape the future and possibly breathe much-needed life into the dormant two-state solution.
SEPTEMBER 17, 2021 11:55
THE SECURITY BARRIER is seen in the background as a Palestinian protester walks with a placard depicting former South African president Nelson Mandela during a demonstration against settlements near the West Bank village of Bil’in in 2013.
(photo credit: MOHAMAD TOROKMAN/REUTERS)
The two-state solution has always been the Zionist solution for Israel to maintain itself as the Jewish nation-state. If there is no two-state solution, then there is no Zionist solution that is acceptable and enables Israel to continue to rule over millions of Palestinians devoid of full political rights as well as not recognizing Israel’s Palestinian citizens as full and equal citizens.
That reality, which we have been living for decades, is clearly a new form of apartheid and should not be acceptable to anyone in the world or to anyone in Israel. A one-state solution, be it a federal state or a confederate state requires Israel to de-Zionize itself to become the state of all of its citizens.
That is what is likely to happen if we continue to follow the line and program of the new Israeli government, which is more positive in the short-term towards the Palestinians than the previous Netanyahu governments, but not much different when it comes to finding longer term solutions.
Prime Minister Bennett has made it quite clear that the Israeli government will not annex the West Bank or parts of the West Bank but will also not allow for the creation of a Palestinian State. This government is continuing to fund settlement expansion. Israeli infrastructure continues to expand in the West Bank at an unprecedented pace.
The new Israeli government has done nothing to rein in Israeli settler violence against Palestinians. Palestinians are still being killed by Israeli soldiers almost every week with virtually no notice of such by the Israeli political center or the Israeli public.
Bennett continues to issue threats to the Hamas leadership and to the people in Gaza regarding any form of protest that they engage in against Israel – whether demonstrations at the border or the use of arms against soldiers or civilians. Bennett has never outlined any coherent Israeli strategy regarding the long-term relations between Israel and the more than 3 million Palestinians in the West Bank.
DEFENSE MINISTER Benny Gantz’s recent meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas promised new Israeli policies aimed at improving the economic conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank and strengthening the Palestinian Authority. Gantz also declared that there is not a long-term Israeli strategy on the issue of Palestinian statehood.
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett chats with Foreign Minister Yair Lapid at the weekly cabinet meeting, August 2021 (credit: RONEN ZVULUN/REUTERS)
Foreign Minister Yair Lapid who is supposed to replace Bennett as Prime Minister in less than two years, outlined on Sunday a “new vision” for Israel’s relations with Gaza, saying that Israel “must move toward a multi-year process in Gaza of economy in return for security” and further said that the aim of such a move is “to create stability on both sides of the border.” Lapid confirmed the position of the government that “the solution presented here doesn’t address the two-state solution, but my opinion on the matter is well known: Israel needs to act to strengthen the Palestinian Authority and to negotiate with it with an aim of achieving a two-state solution.”
Lapid is not alone in the government, there is also Meretz and the Labor Party that support a two-state solution while Tikva Hadasha (New Hope) of Gideon Sa’ar fully rejects the creation of a Palestinian state and Minister of Finance Avigdor Liberman has voiced different opinions on the issue at different times. I don’t think we know for sure what the position of Mansour Abbas and the [United Arab List] Ra’am Party is on the creation of a Palestinian state, or more, what their position is on Israel being the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people since they don’t really deal with the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The position of the vast majority of the international community, including all of Israel’s direct neighbors who have made peace with Israel – Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco – is in support of the two states solution. All of Europe supports the two-state solution, so does most of North and South America, along with Russia and China and most of Asia as well. All of those countries have not yet come to terms with the fading viability of that solution.
In private, some of the European countries have begun discussing alternatives to the two-state solution. Most the young generation of Palestinians and almost every Palestinian think-tank in Palestine and around the world are discussing alternatives to the two-state solution. A few serious think-tanks in Israel are beginning to do that, and a growing number of civil society organizations in Israel are beginning to look at alternatives to the two-state solution.
IT IS clear that the Biden administration has placed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict very low on their agenda. After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan with the Biden Administration’s focus on dealing with the economy and the pandemic, it is almost impossible to imagine a new US Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative. Even I would advise them not to launch a new American peace initiative.
So, if the international community, the US and Israeli Zionists on the left are truly interested in saving the two-state solution before it is too late (and it may already be too late), the question is what can be done that has the power to shock the political systems here in Israel and Palestine into action to save it? My answer is American recognition of the State of Palestine.
The US and the world recognize Israel and recognize the two-state solution as the best solution to the conflict – so why not take the next step? Recognizing the State of Palestine could include the opening of an American Embassy to Palestine in East Jerusalem – in the building that used to hold the US Consulate in East Jerusalem. The US could also announce that the Palestinian office in Washington should be recognized as the Embassy of the State of Palestine to the United States.
This US step could lead to other countries, such as Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and other countries not in the region to declare that they too are willing to open an Embassy to the State of Israel in West Jerusalem and an Embassy to Palestine in East Jerusalem. All of this can be done without the US leading a new peace initiative or relaunching negotiations. Negotiations between the two states on borders, security, the future of Jerusalem and other issues can be conducted at a later time. US recognition of Palestine is a step that could shape the future and possibly breathe much needed life in to the dormant two-state solution.
The writer is a political and social entrepreneur who has dedicated his life to the State of Israel and to peace between Israel and her neighbors. He is now directing The Holy Land Investment Bond.
貝內特，是時候凍結西岸定居點了 - 意見
2021 年 9 月 17 日 13:59
2020 年 6 月 11 日以色列亞基爾定居點的景色。
由於納夫塔利·貝內特 (Naftali Bennett)，現任政府無法與巴勒斯坦人謀求和平。總理是右翼分子，他的六個席位對於罷免本傑明·內塔尼亞胡至關重要。但是貝內特能改變主意嗎？他可能是在假裝嗎？這能被罰款嗎？我說也許在所有方面。
對其他人來說，這沒有問題，因為在需要的時候，巴勒斯坦人會\神奇地離開；作為一個思考和說美國話的聰明的商人，可以肯定地說 Bennett 也不在這個人群中。
那麼，當貝內特在平靜的 Ra'anana 睡覺時到底在想什麼，遠離明顯命運的狂熱定居者幻想？
從他對此事的少數陳述（除了關於“價值觀”的模糊斷言）來看，他認為 1990 年代巴勒斯坦權力機構的建立已經實現了分治。許多聰明的右翼人士認為這一點（右翼強烈反對建立巴勒斯坦權力機構，但他們似乎普遍不為虛偽所困擾）。但問題是以色列和巴勒斯坦人實際上仍然交織在一起。
2021 年 9 月，納夫塔利·貝內特總理訪問以色列國防軍的猶太新年（來源：AMOS BEN-GERSHOM/GPO）
儘管巴勒斯坦領導人樂於假裝不以為然，但他們的自治政府的職能基本上是市政的；以色列法院可以選擇審判巴勒斯坦人；以色列安全部隊可以進入巴勒斯坦權力機構地區，包括“巴勒斯坦權力機構完全控制”的 A 區，而不受懲罰；以色列可以讓補給進入，也可以不讓補給；如果您是在自治島以外需要醫療的巴勒斯坦人，您需要以色列同意；以色列控制整個西岸的陸、海、空所有出入境。
自治地圖看起來也不是任何遠程可持續的東西。巴勒斯坦權力機構掌管著數十個不連續的領土島嶼。以色列控制著它們之間的通行以及該領土其他地方的建築權和自然資源。在某一點上，碎片化變得不可行，我想可以讓 Bennett 看到這一點。
與此同時，在西岸的大部分地區，即聯合控制區 B 和以色列控制區 C，定居者和巴勒斯坦人混在一起，定居者以各種方式明顯受到青睞（美聯社幾年前做過一項研究，當時我是開羅的區域編輯）。巴勒斯坦人定期被可以理解的緊張的士兵殺害（並且經常發動襲擊）。在這種情況下，種族隔離的主張——雖然從歷史上看是不准確的——並非完全荒謬，它們將繼續並增長。Bennett 永遠不會承認這一點，但他知道這一點，我敢肯定。
有些人會說沒有什麼重要，因為和平協議是不可能的，因為巴勒斯坦人是不合理的——特別是他們堅持所謂的回歸權，這在過去破壞以色列的幾個影響深遠的和平提議方面發揮了關鍵作用。 . 這是真的。
是否有希望 Bennett 不僅能理解這一切，還能採取行動？我注意到歷史學家米卡·古德曼 (Micah Goodman) 為他提供了建議，他在他的《第 67 條軍規》一書中做了標記。那本書認為左派和右派都是正確的，因為佔領對以色列不利，但目前無法結束，所以必須管理衝突。
這與凍結定居點並無矛盾（除了一些緊鄰 1949 年停戰線的定居點）。
壓力將轉移到巴勒斯坦人以實物回應，也許在 2023 年夏天，溫和派亞伊爾·拉皮德 (Yair Lapid) 接任總理的最後期限之前。
作者是美聯社前駐開羅的中東編輯和駐倫敦的歐洲/非洲編輯，以及耶路撒冷外國新聞協會的前任主席。他是總部位於紐約的通信公司 Thunder11 的管理合夥人。在 Twitter 上關注他：@perry_dan。
Bennett, it is time to freeze West Bank settlements - Opinion
The millions of Palestinians cannot forever be suppressed, and pressure to make them citizens will grow.
By DAN PERRY
SEPTEMBER 17, 2021 13:59
View of the Israeli settlement of Yakir on June 11, 2020.
(photo credit: SRAYA DIAMANT/FLASH90)
The current government cannot pursue peace with the Palestinians because of Naftali Bennett. The prime minister is a right-winger, and his six seats were critical to removing Benjamin Netanyahu. But could Bennett change his mind? Might he be pretending? Can this be finessed? I say maybe on all counts.
Having lost many of his voters by abandoning Netanyahu’s nationalist bloc – for the handsomest reward – Bennett is in the rare situation of having little to lose. Meanwhile, he is in the familiar position of a sophisticated right-winger who is almost certainly too intelligent to not understand the problem with Israel’s entrenchment in the West Bank. This applied in various ways to Tzipi Livni, Ehud Olmert, Ariel Sharon and even Netanyahu (for a brief moment, before he became Voldemort).
The realization is that Israel with the West Bank is barely 60% Jewish, and with Gaza already is majority-Arab, and that’s not good for Zionism. The millions of Palestinians cannot forever be suppressed, and pressure to make them citizens will grow.
To some Israelis this is no problem because God will fix it; there is not much to discuss with them, but Bennett is not this way, despite his microscopic yarmulke.
To others this is no problem because when need be the Palestinians will \magically depart; as a clever businessman who thinks and speaks American, it’s safe to say Bennett is not in this crowd either.
So what on earth is Bennett thinking when he goes to bed in placid Ra’anana, far away from the feverish settler reveries of manifest destiny?
Judging by his few statements on the matter (other than vague assertions about “values”), he thinks partition has already been achieved by the 1990s establishment of the Palestinian Authority. Many intelligent right-wingers think this (the right bitterly opposed the creation of the Palestinian Authority, but they seem generally untroubled by the hypocrisy). But the problem is that Israel and the Palestinians in fact remain intertwined.
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett visits an IDF post for Rosh Hashanah, September 2021 (credit: AMOS BEN-GERSHOM/GPO)
Though Palestinian leaders are happy to strut about pretending otherwise, their autonomy government’s functions are essentially municipal; Israeli courts can try Palestinians when they so choose; Israeli security forces can enter the PA areas, including “full PA control” Areas A, with impunity; Israel can let supplies in, or not; if you are a Palestinian in need of medical care outside your autonomy island, you need Israel to agree; Israel controls all entry and exit from the overall West Bank, by land, sea and air.
In short, the government that still ultimately governs the Palestinians is in Jerusalem. By the millions these Palestinians cannot vote for that government yet are told its actions must be accepted, because it was “democratically elected.” This is a farce, and it is highly unlikely that Bennett cannot be made to see it.
Nor does the autonomy map look like anything even remotely sustainable. The PA presides over dozens of non-contiguous islands of territory. Israel controls passage between them and building rights and natural resources in the rest of the territory. There is a point where fragmentation becomes unworkable and I imagine Bennett can be made to see this.
Meanwhile, in most of the West Bank, which is joint-control Areas B and Israeli-controlled Area C, settlers and Palestinians are mixed together with the settlers clearly favored in a variety of ways (the AP did a study several years ago, when I was the Cairo-based regional editor). Palestinians are periodically killed by the understandably jittery soldiers (and often stage attacks). Under these circumstances claims of apartheid are – while historically inaccurate – not completely ridiculous, and they will continue and grow. Bennett could never be made to admit this, but he knows it, I am sure.
Some will say that nothing matters because a peace deal is impossible because the Palestinians are unreasonable – especially as evidenced in their insistence on the so-called Right of Return, which played a key role in scuttling several far-reaching Israeli peace offers in the past. And this is true.
But there is a difference between maintaining the status quo while seeking opportunities (perhaps unilateral) for change – and continuing to pour settlers into the territory. Every day that passes and settlers are added brings Israel closer to the point of no return at which it will find itself facing Palestinian demands for annexation and citizens’ rights that will reflect the reality of its control. It would end Zionism and so Israel will resist, but make no mistake: that way lie sanctions and global pariah status.
Is there hope that Bennett might not only understand all this but act? I note that he is advised by historian Micah Goodman, who made a mark with his book Catch 67. That book argued that both the Left and Right are correct in that the occupation is bad for Israel but also it cannot currently be ended, and so the conflict must be managed.
That is not inconsistent with freezing the settlements (with the possible exception of a few that are directly next to the 1949 armistice lines).
If Bennett were to agree to this, the result would be an instant outpouring of good will from the region and the world (and also his coalition). He would stand for something, and he might become a real leader to the remaining pragmatic right-wingers. It would also be a signal to Israelis who seek to end the occupation that his joining with the center-left was not just a stunning gambit to become prime minister.
The pressure would shift to the Palestinians to respond in kind, perhaps by the summer 2023 deadline for the moderate Yair Lapid to take over as prime minister.
What might the Palestinians do? They might have an honest internal discussion on the notion that millions of descendants of Palestinian refugees have a “right” to return to ancestral areas in Israel. It would take courage, but they probably know this idea is standing in their way, and the Sunni part of the Arab world is losing patience with their cause.
Tens of millions of people were dislocated in World War II and its aftermath as the colonial era ended, in part in a movement to create viable nation-states. Germans are not returning to the Sudetenland (though they could under the EU) and Pakistanis do not have any “right” to return to Mumbai. Turks and Greeks, internationally displaced people by the tens of millions in Red China and the Soviet Union – none of their descendants are running around with rusty keys demanding “rights” to return.
In the case of Israel/Palestine, a return would oppose the very demographic logic that might compel Israel to divest itself of strategic territory. Palestinians have argued Israel should accept the principle since few would actually arrive; that would be insane. One can speak of compensation at the most.
That’s what we might hope for in the two years of Bennett: Israel admitting settlement in most parts of the West Bank is wrong, and Palestinians admitting that the return is nonsense. After that, there may be chances for an amicable divorce.
The writer is the former Cairo-based Middle East editor and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press, and a former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem. He is the managing partner of the New York-based communications firm Thunder11. Follow him on Twitter: @perry_dan.
紐約大學斯特恩商業與人權中心的一份報告指出，在 Facebook、TikTok、Twitter、WhatsApp 和 Youtube 上分享了有關巴以沖突雙方的錯誤信息。
2021 年 9 月 17 日 09:35
2021 年 5 月 15 日，在加拿大安大略省多倫多市政廳前，警察排隊將支持巴勒斯坦的抗議者與一小群以色列支持者分開。
紐約大學斯特恩分校的 Paul M. Barrett、Justin Hendrix 和 J. Grant Sims 撰寫的一份題為“助長火勢：社交媒體如何加劇美國政治兩極分化——以及對此可以做些什麼”的報告發現並分析了幾個政治兩極分化的例子受到美國和國際社交媒體使用的推動。
報告指出，衝突雙方在 Facebook、TikTok、Twitter、WhatsApp 和 Youtube 上分享了以視頻、圖像和文本形式存在的錯誤信息。
例如，據稱通過受歡迎的以色列 WhatsApp 群組分享的一條消息稱，“巴勒斯坦人來了”，父母應該“保護他們的孩子”免受接近的巴勒斯坦暴徒的傷害。
同一周，在以色列國防軍入侵加沙地帶之前，發送給一個大型巴勒斯坦 WhatsApp 小組的消息警告說，以色列士兵已經在路上了。報告指出，這些消息都沒有任何事實依據。
該報告還發現，Facebook 和 Twitter 錯誤地阻止或限制了數百萬個主要是親巴勒斯坦人的帖子，原因是它們的自動內容審核系統。
報告發現，大多數親巴勒斯坦的帖子被 Facebook 和 Twitter 刪除，因為它們包含諸如“烈士”和“抵抗”之類的詞，這些詞會觸發算法並被解釋為發出暴力呼籲。
“社交媒體並沒有製造今天的仇恨，但它加劇了問題，”該報告的作者之一保羅·M·巴雷特 (Paul M. Barrett) 說。他補充說：“兩極分化的後果範圍從對民主的失去信心到我們在國會大廈叛亂期間看到的那種政治暴力。”
Social media fuels polarization in Israeli-Palestinian conflict
A report by NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights noted misinformation on both sides of the Palestinian and Israeli conflict was shared on Facebook, TikTok, Twitter, WhatsApp and Youtube.
SEPTEMBER 17, 2021 09:35
Police officers stand in line to separate protesters supporting Palestine from a small group of Israel supporters in front of city hall in Toronto, Ontario, Canada May 15, 2021.
(photo credit: CHRIS HELGREN/REUTERS)
Polarization of opinions in political issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is being directly promoted and fueled by social media, NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights said on Monday.
A report, titled "Fueling the Fire: How Social Media Intensifies US Political Polarization - And What Can Be Done About It," by NYU Stern's Paul M. Barrett, Justin Hendrix and J. Grant Sims, found and analyzed several instances of political polarization being driven by the use of social media, both in the US and internationally.
The report noted misinformation, in the form of videos, images and texts, on both sides of the conflict was shared on Facebook, TikTok, Twitter, WhatsApp and Youtube.
For example, a message allegedly shared via popular Israeli WhatsApp groups stated that "Palestinians are coming" and that parents should "protect their children" from the approaching Palestinian mob.
In the same week, a message sent to a large Palestinian WhatsApp group warned ahead of an IDF invasion of the
, claiming Israeli soldiers were already on their way. The report states neither of those messages carry any factual basis.
The report also found that Facebook and Twitter wrongly blocked or restricted millions of mostly Pro-Palestinian posts, due to their automated content moderation systems.
Senior Facebook executives spoke with Israeli and Palestinian officials to discuss how their content-removal algorithm affected the conflict and even went as far as to establish a 'special operations center' in Israel, with both Arabic and Hebrew speakers monitoring content that violates the rules of the site.
The report found that most pro-Palestinian posts were removed by Facebook and Twitter because they included words such as "martyr" and "resistance," which trigger the algorithms and are interpreted as signaling calls to violence.
Social media: Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, TikTok (credit: Courtesy)
This caused many Palestinians to claim to have experienced an 'unjustified degree of censorship' on social media platforms.
The report states Israel's proficient cyber units flag large quantities of hateful and violent content from Palestinians, which causes an imbalance as Palestinians lack these methods of combatting disinformation on social media.
"Social media didn't create today's hatred, but it intensifies the problem," said Paul M. Barrett, one of the report's authors. "The consequences of polarization range from a loss of faith in democracy to the sort of political violence we saw during the insurrection at the Capitol," he added.
2021 年 9 月 17 日 12:37
2021 年 3 月 1 日，在奧地利維也納爆發冠狀病毒病 (COVID-19) 期間，在理事會會議開始之前，伊朗國旗在國際原子能機構 (IAEA) 總部前飄揚。
這些軟化的立場包括表明願意允許伊斯蘭共和國將其先進的離心機 - 這可以使其以更快的速度生產核彈材料 - 儲存起來，而不是最初的需求幾乎全部被銷毀。
順便提一下，根據 2015 年的 JCPOA 伊朗核協議，德黑蘭被允許保留數量非常有限的先進離心機，而現在它已經運行了數百台。
此外，據報導，作為重返 JCPOA 的一部分，拜登政府在取消哪些制裁方面表現出了一些額外的靈活性。
上週五，伊朗總統選舉的獲勝者 Ebrahim Raisi 在伊朗的一個投票站旁觀（圖片來源：MAJID ASGARIPOUR/WANA/REUTERS）
這些在 Raisi 之前的讓步是可能鼓勵伊朗新領導人通過將談判拖延四個月並以 60% 的濃縮度向前推進來尋求更多讓步的部分原因——僅比武器級鈾所需的 90% 低一級。
IAEA 沒有透露其相機的損壞是否是由 6 月對伊朗卡拉季核設施（歸以色列所有）的襲擊造成的，其結論是基於伊朗的報告還是獨立確認了損壞原因。
這是一個重要的問題，因為它引發了人們懷疑伊朗人在過去幾個月中篡改了 IAEA 的設備以隱藏某些活動——儘管值得注意的是，以色列官員並未否認參與了卡拉傑襲擊事件。
但眨眼仍在眨眼，伊斯蘭共和國尚未得到它所尋求的重大讓步——美國在重返 JCPOA 之前全面解除制裁。
根據該協議，伊朗將需要在解除制裁之前放棄其所有濃縮至 60% 和 20% 的鈾以及大部分濃縮至 5% 的鈾。
國防部長本尼·甘茨成為第一位公開減少對美國重返 JCPOA 的反對的以色列高級官員。
貝內特曾試圖在民主黨中贏回對以色列的支持，該黨在內塔尼亞胡領導下達到了歷史最低水平，此前他曾於 2015 年在美國國會發表演講公開攻擊巴拉克奧巴馬。
就在一天前，外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德 (Yair Lapid) 淡化了伊朗的成就，即距離製造核武器的鈾充足僅一個月。
以色列國防軍參謀長中將。Aviv Kohavi 和多位以色列國防軍情報官員認為這個數字接近兩年。
這種差異主要源於自 2003 年時代（摩薩德奪取伊朗核檔案後，以色列對這個時代非常了解）以來，伊朗在引爆和彈道導彈發展領域取得了多少秘密成就，以及德黑蘭可能會或可能不會進行哪些活動身體上和經濟上有能力同時進行。
但結合甘茨的聲明，似乎至少以色列現任政府的一些成員準備接受美國重返 JCPOA 的決定，前提是他們能得到在違反協議的情況下迅速恢復經濟制裁的保證，並得到美國的保證如果有必要，它不會抵制以色列未來襲擊伊朗核設施的計劃。
所有這一切會導致伊朗和美國重返 JCPOA 嗎？
新的 JCPOA 會是什麼樣子，拜登政府是否會恪守其對 JCPOA 實施附加條款以修復交易漏洞的承諾？
US, Iran, Israel nuke standoff, everyone blinks - now what? - analysis
Blinking from all sides over the last few weeks and even days has started to reshape the geopolitics surrounding the issue of the Iran nuclear deal talks.
SEPTEMBER 17, 2021 12:37
The Iranian flag waves in front of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters, before the beginning of a board of governors meeting, amid the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak in Vienna, Austria, March 1, 2021.
(photo credit: REUTERS/LISI NIESNER/FILE PHOTO)
In the ongoing nuclear standoff involving the US and Iran – with Israel and the moderate Sunni Arab states the most actively interested parties on the sidelines – everyone has now blinked.
Where that means the nuclear standoff will go next is less certain.
The US blinked first.
Israeli intelligence sources have explained that when Washington saw that Ebrahim Raisi would be elected president, it softened some of its redlines, hoping to wrap up a deal before he came on.
These softened positions included showing a willingness to allow the Islamic Republic place its advanced centrifuges - which could allow it to produce a material for a nuclear bomb at a faster rate - in storage as opposed to the original demand that almost all be destroyed.
Incidentally, under the 2015 JCPOA Iran nuclear deal, Tehran was allowed to retain a very limited number of its advanced centrifuges, compared to the now hundreds it has operating.
Further, the Biden administration reportedly showed some additional flexibility on which sanctions it would remove as part of a return to the JCPOA.
THE WINNER of Iran’s presidential election, Ebrahim Raisi, looks on at a polling station in Iran this past Friday (credit: MAJID ASGARIPOUR/WANA/REUTERS)
These pre-Raisi concessions are part of what may have encouraged the new Iranian leader to seek more concessions by stalling he negotiations for four months and barreling forward with 60% enrichment – only one step down from the 90% needed for weapons-grade uranium.
Iran blinked next.
Last week, the Islamic Republic agreed to renew talks with the IAEA over nuclear inspections and allowed the agency initial access to some of its nuclear observation equipment after months of being locked out.
Notably, some of the equipment was reported as damaged and the IAEA gave its first details about the damage.
The IAEA did not reveal whether the damage to its cameras was caused by the June attack on Iran's Karaj nuclear facility (attributed to Israel) and whether its conclusion was based on Iranian reports or it had independently confirmed the cause of the damage.
This is an important question since it raises suspicions that the Iranians tampered with IAEA equipment over the last few months to hide certain activities – though it is noteworthy that Israeli officials have not denied involvement in the Karaj attack.
One could argue that Iran did not blink so much as it finally started to cash in on the new conciliatory approach in Washington.
But blinking is still blinking and the Islamic Republic has not yet received the major concession it has sought - a full lifting of sanctions by the US before a return to the JCPOA.
Under the deal, Iran would need to give up all of its uranium enriched to 60% and 20% and most of what has been enriched to 5% before sanctions are lifted.
Israel also seemed to blink in pre-Yom Kippur interviews.
Defense Minister Benny Gantz became the first senior Israeli official to publicly reduce opposition to an American return to the JCPOA.
Until now Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Gantz and all other Israeli officials were publicly opposed to the deal.
If there was a difference between the Netanyahu and Bennett approaches, it was in style: Netanyahu wanted to make the fight with the US over Iran a constant source of friction to win political points with portions of the American and Israeli electorate and possibly to intimidate Iran.
Bennett has tried to win back support for Israel in the Democratic party which reached historically-low levels under Netanyahu and after he publicly attacked Barack Obama with a speech before the US Congress in 2015.
Gantz's statement crossed a new line.
It came only a day after Foreign Minister Yair Lapid played down Iran's achievement of getting to a point of being only one month from sufficient uranium for a nuclear weapon.
Lapid said out loud what only Israeli critics, nuclear scientists and sometimes IDF officials were saying quietly when Israeli politicians rattled their sabers about how close Iran was to a nuclear weapon.
He explained that even if the Islamic Republic gets to the point where it has enough uranium, it would still be more than a few months away from being able to deliver a nuclear weapon.
In fact, even hawkish nuclear experts and (non-political) Israeli intelligence officials have said for some time that the fastest Iran could develop a nuclear weapon after it had sufficient weaponized uranium would be six months.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Aviv Kohavi and multiple IDF intelligence officials have put the number at closer to two years.
The disparity primarily derives from how much Iran has accomplished clandestinely in the areas of detonation and ballistic missile development since the 2003 era (an era which Israel knows a lot about after the Mossad seized Iran's nuclear archives) and what activities Tehran might or might not be physically and financially capable of undertaking in parallel.
But saying this out loud, Lapid reduced the urgency that Israel has placed on Iran's pressing forward to a nuclear bomb.
Lapid could be trying to ease pressure on the US to rush back into a deal under the argument that if Iran is not that close to building a bomb, then the US can wait for a "better" deal.
But taken along with Gantz's statement, it seems that at least some members of the current Israeli government are ready to swallow a US return to the JCPOA provided they get guarantees of economic sanctions snapping back in the event of a violation and assurances from the US that it would not resist Israeli plans to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in the future if necessary.
Will all of this lead to an Iranian and American return to the JCPOA?
What will the new JCPOA look like and will the Biden administration stay true to its commitment to enforce an add-on to the JCPOA to fix the deal's holes?
How will Israel act if Washington and the West simply wilt under Iranian pressure and suffice with a slightly weaker JCPOA in which Iran permanently gets to keep its hundreds of advanced centrifuges – even if they are temporarily closeted?
These are all open questions.
But the blinking from all sides over the last few days has started to reshape the geopolitics surrounding the issue, and it seems some more changes and surprises may not be far off.
軍事事務：在帕爾馬希姆基地待了三年後，準將。Yoav Amiram 告訴《郵報》，正是包容性，就像軍事進步一樣，讓他感到自豪
2021 年 9 月 16 日 23:59
位於一個自然保護區內，近 5,000 名軍人駐紮在 Rishon Lezion 西南基地，該基地直到最近才由準將指揮。約夫·阿米拉姆。
阿米拉姆在印度空軍服役近 30 年，接受過直升機飛行員訓練，在被任命為指揮角色之前駕駛過幾個不同的平台，最後在過去三年中擔任帕爾馬希姆基地指揮官。
“一切都與我剛開始時大不相同，技術產生了很大的影響，”他說。“二十年前，我們與今天的 IAF 能力相去甚遠。今天，有更多的技術，但歸根結底，賦予你的責任仍然是一樣的。”
Palmahim 成立於 50 年前，當時是一個導彈和衛星試驗基地，現在仍然是以色列唯一將衛星發射到太空的地點之一。
去年 7 月，Ofek 16 衛星使用 Shavit 發射器進入軌道——據國外報導，該發射器用於發射 Jericho 彈道導彈。後來它發回了一些圖像，其中一張來自敘利亞城市巴爾米拉，靠近已知伊朗軍隊活動的地方。
以色列是擁有衛星發射能力的 13 個國家之一，這一事實並非空穴來風。發射本身就是一項偉大的成就——它是向西進行的，反對地球自轉，因此它的軌道將它帶出地中海，在發射期間避開任何敵方領土。
IAF 無人機中隊飛行約 80% 的 IAF 飛行時數，4 個無人機中隊設在 Palmahim 空軍基地，70% 的 IAF 飛行時數從基地起飛。
無人機在 5 月的“城牆守護者行動”中發揮了重要且不可或缺的作用，其中大部分是從帕爾馬希姆起飛的。根據以色列國防軍的數據，在加沙地帶與恐怖組織作戰的 11 天裡，無人機執行了 643 次任務，飛行時間共計 132.6 小時。
根據阿米拉姆的說法，以色列國防軍的 Momentum 多年計劃對戰鬥產生了重大影響，包括無人機部隊，這是實時情報收集的重要組成部分。
雖然他們沒有配備人員，但做出最終決定的總是地面上的男人或女人。一個不斷增長的趨勢是，遙控飛機 (RPA) 世界在保護任務安全的同時，始終面臨著附帶損害的困境。
“當你在 Palmahim 時，當基地和他們父母家中的 tzeva adom [紅色警戒] 警報響起時，他們知道他們正在保護他們的家園。但這並不簡單。因為無人機操作員可以看到一切。如果人們[被空襲]受傷，他們會看到。”
任何開車到 Palmahim 自然保護區海灘的人只需瞥一眼窗外，就能看到保護平民和基礎設施的導彈防禦系統。
這個大型空軍基地也是 IAF 防空部門的所在地，該部門負責該國的綜合保護傘，以應對日益增長的導彈威脅。
這包括旨在擊落短程火箭的鐵穹、攔截地球大氣層外彈道導彈的箭（Arrow-2 和 Arrow-3）系統，以及新投入使用的大衛彈弓導彈防禦系統。旨在攔截戰術彈道導彈、中遠程火箭以及射程在 40 至 300 公里之間的巡航導彈。
基地還有 IAF 的 Shaldag 特種部隊單位（IDF 最精銳的單位之一）、第 123 黑鷹中隊、IAF 的第 7 聯隊（新的特種作戰聯隊）、軍方的無人機學校、RPA 模擬器中隊和直升機等等。
無人機學校旁邊是 ATID Palmahim 職業高中，有 300 名處於危險中的青少年，他們由部隊指導。阿米拉姆說，他們中的許多人隨後應徵入伍，進入了軍隊的專業技術職位。
該基地的另一個項目是“特殊制服”，該項目有助於將患有自閉症和其他殘疾的青年帶到全國 20 個基地的志願者。Palmahim 的項目有 50-60 名志願者。
對於阿米拉姆來說，在他 30 年的服役生涯中，以色列國防軍不僅是為了保衛國家，而且是以色列社會的核心組成部分，在服役期間能夠更好地培養青年人是他作為指揮官角色的一個重要方面。
How the IAF has become a more inclusive military
MILITARY AFFAIRS: After three years at Palmahim Base, Brig.-Gen. Yoav Amiram tells the ‘Post’ that it was the inclusivity, just as much as military advancements, that made him proud
SEPTEMBER 16, 2021 23:59
Palmahim air base is one of the Israel Air Force’s largest bases, and in recent years has become its busiest, with remotely piloted aircraft taking off from the airfield dozens of times daily.
Located within a nature reserve, close to 5,000 service members are stationed at the base southwest of Rishon Lezion, which, until recently, was commanded by Brig.-Gen. Yoav Amiram.
The Jerusalem Post met with Amiram on his last day as base commander and spoke with him about the changes he witnessed throughout his career – from a more technological air force to a more inclusive military.
Amiram, who served close to 30 years in the IAF, was trained as a helicopter pilot and flew several different platforms before being appointed to command roles and then finally as Palmahim base commander for the past three years.
“Everything is so different from when I started, and technology has had a big effect,” he said. “Twenty years ago we were really far from the capabilities that we have today in the IAF. Today, there’s a lot more technology, but at the end of the day, the responsibility that is given to you is still the same.”
Palmahim was founded 50 years ago as a missile and satellite test base and remains one of the only locations in Israel where satellites are launched to space.
Like Israel’s air force, the satellite industry is a key component of the Jewish state’s strategic military capabilities. They are the real eye in the sky, keeping a close eye on Israel’s enemies 24/7 from afar.
Last July, the Ofek 16 satellite was launched into orbit using a Shavit launcher – which according to foreign reports is used to launch Jericho ballistic missiles. It later sent back a number of images, including one from over the Syrian city of Palmyra, close to where Iranian forces are known to operate.
The fact that Israel is one of 13 countries with satellite-launching capabilities is not a given. And the launch alone is in itself a great achievement – it is carried out to the west, against the rotation of the Earth, so that its trajectory takes it out over the Mediterranean Sea, avoiding any enemy territory during the launch period.
As a result of launching westward, Ofek satellites operate in retrograde orbits and decrease the launcher’s payload capacity, as it requires more thrust to place the satellite into orbit compared to if it would fly eastward.
“It’s amazing to see that such a small country has the ability to launch satellites,” Amiram said. “Israeli satellites are the smallest in the world but the strongest in terms of capabilities. But it’s something that has to work to the second and exact millimeter. It’s not simple.”
But satellites aren’t the only eyes in the skies that take off from Palmahim.
Over the past decade, the IAF’s operational use of drones has increased drastically, with almost every operation now seeing the use of these devices.
IAF drone squadrons fly about 80% of all IAF flight hours, and with four drone squadrons based at Palmahim AFB, 70% of all IAF flight hours take off from the base.
Drones played a significant and integral part in Operation Guardian of the Walls in May, with most of them taking off from Palmahim. According to IDF data, 643 missions were done by drones for a total of 132.6 flight hours during the 11 days of fighting with terror groups in the Gaza Strip.
According to Amiram, the IDF’s Momentum multiyear plan had a significant impact on the fighting, including the drone units, which were an instrumental part of real-time intelligence gathering.
With the army’s drone school located at Palmahim, operators learn how to fly and maintain these aircraft, at the base where many of them will serve.
“We train them to be fighters, from the sky,” he said, explaining that “the operators are in the battle, maybe not physically there, but they are an integral part of the battlefield and have an immediate impact.”
While they aren’t manned, it’s always the man or woman on the ground who makes the final decision. A growing trend, the remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) world has a constant dilemma of collateral damage while preserving the safety of the mission.
And unlike American drone operators, who widely operate thousands of kilometers from the battlefield, the fact that these operators are based in Palmahim drives home the point that they are protecting their families, friends and country.
“When you are at Palmahim and a tzeva adom [red alert] siren goes off on the base and at their parent’s home, they know that they are protecting their homes. But it’s not simple. Because the drone operators see everything. If people are hurt [by an airstrike], they see it.”
ANYONE DRIVING to the beach in the Palmahim nature reserve only needs to glance out their window to see the missile defense batteries protecting civilians and infrastructure.
The large air base is also home to the IAF’s Air Defense Division, which is in charge of the country’s comprehensive protective umbrella that counters the growing missile threats.
This includes the Iron Dome, designed to shoot down short-range rockets, the Arrow (Arrow-2 and Arrow-3) system, which intercepts ballistic missiles outside of the Earth’s atmosphere, and the newly operational David’s Sling missile defense system, which is designed to intercept tactical ballistic missiles, medium- to long-range rockets, as well as cruise missiles fired at ranges between 40 to 300 km.
Israel also has three American-made Patriot system batteries, a long-range, all-altitude defense system to counter tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and advanced aircraft.
Also at the base is the IAF’s Shaldag special forces unit (one of the IDF’s most elite units), the 123rd Black Hawk Squadron, the IAF’s 7th Wing (the new special operations wing), the military’s drone school, a simulator squadron for RPAs and helicopters and more.
“After the initial shock of getting here, you can understand the potential that this base has,” Amiram said. “There’s the IAF, ground forces, navy, defense companies… there’s a lot of heterogeneity at Palmahim.”
But it’s not only the military platforms that led Amiram to be proud of the base he commanded over, it was the social inclusion and school at the base that brought a sparkle to his eyes.
Right next to the drone school is the ATID Palmahim vocational high school for 300 at-risk teenagers, who are mentored by troops. Many of them, Amiram said, then draft into professional technical positions in the military.
Another program on the base is Special in Uniform, which helps to bring youth with autism and other disabilities to volunteer in 20 bases across the country. There are 50-60 volunteers from the program at Palmahim.
“It’s very meaningful, and what the volunteers bring to the base is incredible,” he said. “When troops are working together with the volunteers who have special needs, they come out a lot more aware and see the world differently.”
For Amiram, throughout his 30 years of service, the IDF was not only meant to defend the country, but a central component to Israeli society, and being able to better youth during their service was an important aspect of his role as a commander.
“We need to better our society, we need that to happen,” he said. “We might not get to everyone but we need to get to as many as possible. Everyone here has the same opportunity. It’s a privilege that we need to take advantage of or else we will miss it.”