2021.07.02 國際新聞導讀-伊朗宗教領袖欽點強硬派神職人員擔任新司法部長以掌握執法部門、以色列LIKUD集團內部反納唐亞胡聲音雀起、以色列有意循亞伯拉罕協議與更多阿拉伯國家關係正常化

蘇老師講解國際新聞、中東與中亞歷史、中國事務、太空知識的頻道。 Diplomat's daily news review and history research on Middle East and Central Asia, China Affairs and Space Exploration

2021.07.02 國際新聞導讀-伊朗宗教領袖欽點強硬派神職人員擔任新司法部長以掌握執法部門、以色列LIKUD集團內部反納唐亞胡聲音雀起、以色列有意循亞伯拉罕協議與更多阿拉伯國家關係正常化

伊朗最高領袖哈梅內伊任命強硬派神職人員為司法部長

長期擔任司法官員和前情報部長的 Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei 將接替將於 8 月初成為總統的 Ebrahim Raisi。

通過路透

2021 年 7 月 1 日 13:13

2020 年 11 月 3 日，伊朗最高領袖阿亞圖拉·阿里·哈梅內伊在先知穆罕默德誕辰之際在伊朗德黑蘭發表虛擬演講。

（圖片來源：哈梅內伊官方網站/通過路透社的講義）

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據伊朗官方媒體報導，伊朗最高領袖週四任命強硬派神職人員 Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei 為新的司法機構負責人，該機構負責執行伊斯蘭法律，並被人權組織指責嚴厲打擊異議人士。

長期擔任司法官員和前情報部長的 Ejei 將接替 Ebrahim Raisi，後者將於6 月 18日贏得大選後於 8 月初成為總統。

最高領袖阿亞圖拉·阿里·哈梅內伊 (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) 任命埃傑 (Eje​​i) 之際，伊朗面臨西方人權組織和國際機構對賴西 (Raisi) 選舉的新批評，拉伊西 (Raisi) 被批評者指責在其司法生涯中犯有一系列虐待行為。他否認有不當行為。

據國家通訊社 IRNA 報導，哈梅內伊在一份聲明中敦促穆赫塞尼·埃傑“促進正義，恢復公共權利，確保合法自由，監督法律的正確實施，預防犯罪，堅決打擊腐敗”。

聯合國伊朗人權調查員呼籲對 1988 年國家下令處決數千名政治犯的指控以及賴西作為德黑蘭副檢察官所扮演的角色進行獨立調查。

聯合國的 Javaid Rehman 本週告訴路透社：“正如我在我的報告中所描述的，無論是過去還是現在，該國都普遍存在系統性的嚴重侵犯人權的有罪不罰現象。”

“在國內渠道中，按照國際標准進行問責的真正途徑很少，”雷曼說。

伊朗一再駁斥對其人權記錄的批評是毫無根據的，而且是由於對其伊斯蘭法律缺乏了解。它表示其法律體係是獨立的，不受政治利益的影響。

大赦國際和人權觀察上個月表示，賴西的當選是對人權的打擊，並呼籲對他在 1988 年處決中的角色進行調查。

Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei appoints hardline cleric as judiciary head

Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, a long-term judicial official and former intelligence minister, replaces Ebrahim Raisi, who is due to become president in early August.

By REUTERS

JULY 1, 2021 13:13

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivers a virtual speech, on the occasion of the Prophet Mohammad's birthday, in Tehran, Iran November 3, 2020.

(photo credit: OFFICIAL KHAMENEI WEBSITE/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)

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Iran’s Supreme Leader on Thursday appointed hardline cleric Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei as the new head of the judiciary, state media reported, a body that enforces Islamic laws and is accused by rights groups of cracking down harshly on dissent.

Ejei, a long-term judicial official and former intelligence minister, replaces Ebrahim Raisi, who is due to become president in early August after winning a June 18 election.

Ejei's appointment by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei comes as Iran faces renewed criticism by Western human rights groups and international bodies over the election of Raisi, who is accused by critics of a series of abuses during his judicial career. He denies wrongdoing.

In a statement, Khamenei urged Mohseni Ejei to "promote justice, restore public rights, ensure legitimate freedoms, and oversee the proper implementation of laws, prevent crime, and resolutely fight corruption", state news agency IRNA reported.

The UN investigator on human rights in Iran has called for an independent inquiry into allegations of state-ordered executions of thousands of political prisoners in 1988 and the role played by Raisi as Tehran deputy prosecutor.

"As I have described in my reports, there is a widespread and systemic impunity in the country for gross violations of human rights, both historically in the past and in the present," U.N.'s Javaid Rehman told Reuters this week.

"There are very few if any real avenues for accountability in line with international standards within domestic channels," Rehman said.

Iran has repeatedly dismissed the criticism of its human rights record as baseless and due to a lack of understanding of its Islamic laws. It says its legal system is independent and not influenced by political interests.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said last month that Raisi's election was a blow for human rights and called for him to be investigated over his role in the 1988 executions.

亞伯拉罕協議對以色列本身的影響

國家事務：連接從阿布扎比到馬加爾的相關點

作者：HERB KEINON

2021 年 7 月 1 日 22:23

本週早些時候，外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德在阿布扎比會見了阿拉伯聯合酋長國外交部長謝赫·阿卜杜拉·本·扎耶德·阿勒納哈揚。

“從根本上說，阿聯酋和以色列決定在 2020 年簽署具有歷史意義的亞伯拉罕協議時採取不同的做法，”外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德和他的酋長國同行謝赫·阿卜杜拉·本·扎耶德·阿勒納哈揚週四在阿布扎比報紙《國家報》上寫道。 .

他們寫道：“隨著阿聯酋和以色列之間建立外交關係，我們兩國著手為我們地區確定一種新的範式……”。“雖然亞伯拉罕協議是我們地區的第一個此類協議，但它們代表了一個我們認為必須變得更加普遍的未來：一個將分歧放在一邊以支持對話的未來。”

並非每天都有以色列和阿拉伯外交部長一起寫專欄，它為拉皮德對阿拉伯聯合酋長國為期兩天的訪問——以色列部長的首次正式訪問——提供了一個合適的結論。以色列駐阿布扎比大使館及其駐迪拜領事館落成。

雖然有些人在閱讀外長關於亞伯拉罕協議是該地區首創的言論時可能會猜測下一個阿拉伯國家可能會跟隨阿聯酋、巴林、摩洛哥和蘇丹的步伐，並與以色列實現關係正常化，協議的漣漪已經可以在離家更近的地方感受到——在以色列國內。

就在秋季簽署亞伯拉罕協議，開啟以色列與阿拉伯世界關係的範式轉變之際，當時的總理本傑明·內塔尼亞胡和曼蘇爾·阿巴斯之間的提議是否巧合，然後是聯合名單？

這些提議隨後導致了以色列政治的範式轉變，阿巴斯脫離了四個阿拉伯政黨的聯合名單，並與他自己的 Ra'am（阿拉伯聯合名單）派系獨立運作，並傳達了可以聯合起來的信息與猶太復國主義政府——甚至是右翼猶太復國主義政府——如果這促進了以色列和阿拉伯的利益。

這種轉變是雙向的：內塔尼亞胡和利庫德集團願意與阿拉伯政黨合作，長期以來被右翼視為以色列議會中名副其實的第五縱隊；一個願意與建立定居點的右翼總理打交道的阿拉伯政黨繼續在加沙周圍實施封鎖，12 年來在與巴勒斯坦人的外交戰線上沒有取得任何進展。

一旦內塔尼亞胡和利庫德集團越過盧比孔河並表現出與阿巴斯進行政治合作的意願，這為以色列議會中的其他政黨也這樣做鋪平了道路。這最終導致了目前擁有 61 個席位的聯盟的形成，該聯盟包括並依賴於阿巴斯和拉姆的四個席位。

這恰恰證明了 1988 年的舊競選口號“只有利庫德集團可以”背後的真相——儘管不是利庫德集團公關人員所想的那樣。他們認為，只有利庫德集團才能提供“個人安全、真正的和平、自由市場和社會正義”，就像那一年令人難忘的競選廣告。

相反，只有利庫德集團的梅納赫姆貝京可以與埃及簽署和平協議，其中包括從西奈半島完全撤出，因為如果工黨的西蒙佩雷斯提出這個想法，貝京和右翼就會強烈反對它。

同樣，只有利庫德集團的阿里爾·沙龍可以提議、推動和實施從加沙地帶的全面撤軍，因為如果佩雷斯和工黨提出同樣的想法，他們就會被沙龍和利庫德集團粉碎。

同樣，只有在內塔尼亞胡和利庫德集團合法化並與阿拉伯政黨進行猶太政治合作之後，Yesh Atid 領導人 Yair Lapid 可以與 Abbas 進行聯盟談判，而 Yamina 領導人 Naftali Bennett 可以加入與 Ra'am 的聯盟。將以色列視為猶太人的民族家園。

ABBAS 也需要從某個地方獲得合法性，因為他願意與內塔尼亞胡接觸，然後進入由右翼政治家貝內特領導的政府。儘管他設法勉強通過選舉門檻並以四個席位進入以色列議會，但阿巴斯的和解方式和他與右翼接觸的哲學——儘管巴勒斯坦問題遠未得到解決——並沒有讓他在阿拉伯國家中廣受歡迎。街道。

據信，他和他所在政黨的未來在很大程度上取決於現任政府的存亡，因為如果政府現在垮台，明天舉行選舉，拉姆很可能會加入亞米納、新希望和梅雷茨的行列。可能只是為了重返下屆以色列議會而奮鬥的政黨。

這就是亞伯拉罕協議發揮作用的地方，也是阿巴斯能夠為他的步驟獲得合法性的地方。

如果阿拉伯聯合酋長國不僅可以與以色列談判並最終與右翼內塔尼亞胡談判並最終簽署協議，因為他們意識到這樣做是在促進他們國家的利益，那麼為什麼以色列不能——阿拉伯政黨與以色列政府合作甚至加入，即使是一個右翼總理的政府，如果這樣做可以促進以色列阿拉伯人的利益？

如果阿聯酋可以在巴勒斯坦問題尚未解決的情況下與以色列實現關係正常化，因為這將有助於它反擊伊朗的霸權區域設計，使其受益於以色列的技術、農業和情報實力，以及使其能夠從美國購買 F35，那麼如果這對以色列-阿拉伯社區有利，為什麼阿拉伯政黨與以色列右翼政府打交道同樣不合適呢？

阿巴斯意識到，坐在桌子周圍的人會吃飽，如果以色列-阿拉伯社區想要公平地分享該國的資源——而不僅僅是不時從桌子上扔掉一些碎片——它需要圍繞櫃桌。它必須願意坐在那張桌子旁，即使它不喜歡廚師為其他人提供的一切。

例如，Abbas 和 Ra'am 肯定會在阿拉伯街頭受到批評，因為他們繼續坐在一個本週與定居點領導人達成妥協的政府中，即不會拆除 Evyatar 的非法前哨，而是變成一支軍隊營地等待調查是巴勒斯坦私人土地還是國有土地，屆時它可能成為猶太教的所在地。

同樣，如果同意讓聯盟將家庭團聚法再延長一年，禁止 35 歲以下的巴勒斯坦男性和 25 歲以下的女性與他們的以色列配偶住在裡面的妥協，Ra'am 肯定會採取行動。綠線。

在這兩種情況下，都會詢問該黨如何向採取此類措施的政府伸出援手。

在這裡，阿巴斯也可以從阿拉伯聯合酋長國和其他亞伯拉罕協議國家獲得掩護，儘管梅在加沙地帶進行了小型戰爭，但這些國家仍繼續與以色列實現正常化。

在以色列與哈馬斯戰鬥僅一個月後，拉皮德前往阿聯酋——或者阿布扎比歡迎他——並不是一件小事。此外，阿聯酋東道主在訪問期間明確表示，加沙沖突不會影響蓬勃發展的關係。為什麼不？因為這些關係對阿聯酋有利。

因此，如果阿聯酋不讓一場為期 11 天的戰爭——在這場戰爭中 256 名巴勒斯坦人被殺，加沙地帶被以色列火力摧毀——破壞了它與這個猶太國家的關係，那麼 Ra'am 是否需要因為政府對 Evyatar 或家庭團聚法的妥協？

Lapid 和 bin Zayed 在寫到阿聯酋與以色列關係的轉型潛力時，考慮到了更大的區域發展，希望以色列與阿聯酋之間關係的成功將影響該地區的態度。

然而，似乎最強烈地感受到這種潛力的地方不是在沙特阿拉伯或巴基斯坦，而是在阿巴斯的家鄉馬加爾和內蓋夫的貝都因人（拉姆的政治支持的基石）等地方。從該黨加入聯盟中受益最大，因為政府已承諾承認內蓋夫三個未被承認的貝都因人村莊。

從表面上看，拉皮德本週對阿布扎比的訪問和聯盟的發展似乎是孤立進行的。但他們沒有。有一條線將這兩個遙遠的點連接起來：亞伯拉罕協議和拉姆在這個聯盟中的成員身份。

Abraham Accords' impact felt within Israel itself

NATIONAL AFFAIRS: Connecting the related dots from Abu Dhabi to Maghar

By HERB KEINON

JULY 1, 2021 22:23

FOREIGN MINISTER Yair Lapid meets with United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi earlier this week.

(photo credit: WAM/REUTERS)

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“Fundamentally, the UAE and Israel decided to do things differently with the signing of the historic Abraham Accords in 2020,” Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and his Emirate counterpart, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, wrote on Thursday in the Abu Dhabi newspaper The National.

“With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel, our two countries set out to determine a new paradigm for our region…,” they wrote. “While the Abraham Accords were the first of their kind in our region, they represent a future that we believe must become more commonplace: one in which differences are set aside in favor of dialogue.”

It’s not every day that an Israeli and an Arab foreign minister pen an op-ed together, and it served as a suiting conclusion to Lapid’s two-day visit to the United Arab Emirates – the first official visit by an Israeli minister – during which he inaugurated Israel’s embassy in Abu Dhabi, and its consulate in Dubai.

While some reading the foreign ministers’ words about the Abraham Accords being the first of its kind in the region may speculate about which Arab country may be next to follow the lead of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan and normalize ties with Israel, the ripples from the accords can already be felt much closer to home – within Israel itself.

Is it a coincidence that just as the Abraham Accords were signed in the fall, ushering in a paradigmatic shift in Israel’s relations with the Arab world, overtures were being made between then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Mansour Abbas, then of the Joint List?

Those overtures then led to a paradigmatic shift in Israeli politics, with Abbas breaking away from the Joint List of four Arab parties and running independently with his own Ra’am (United Arab List) faction, with a message that it is okay to join forces with a Zionist government – even a right-wing Zionist government – if this promotes Israeli-Arab interests.

This shift went in both directions: Netanyahu and the Likud willing to cooperate with an Arab party, long viewed on the Right as a veritable fifth column in the Knesset; and an Arab party willing to deal with a right-wing prime minister who built in the settlements, continues to enforce a blockade around Gaza and in 12 years made no progress on the diplomatic front with the Palestinians.

Once Netanyahu and the Likud crossed the Rubicon and showed a willingness to cooperate politically with Abbas, that paved the way for other parties in the Knesset to do the same. This eventually led to the formation of the current 61-seat coalition, which includes, and depends for its survival, on Abbas and Ra’am’s four seats.

This just proves the truth behind that old 1988 campaign slogan, “only the Likud can” – though not in the way the Likud publicists had in mind. They had in mind that only the Likud, as the memorable campaign jingle went that year, could provide “personal security, real peace, a free market and social justice.”

Instead, only the Likud’s Menachem Begin could have signed a peace deal with Egypt that included a complete and total withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, because had Labor’s Shimon Peres put that idea on the table, Begin and the Right would have worked feverishly against it.

Likewise, only Ariel Sharon of the Likud could have proposed, promoted and implemented a full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, because had Peres and Labor proposed the same idea they would have been pulverized by Sharon and the Likud.

By the same token, Yesh Atid head Yair Lapid could conduct coalition negotiations with Abbas, and Yamina leader Naftali Bennett could join a coalition with Ra’am, only after Netanyahu and the Likud legitimized and made kosher political cooperation with an Arab party that does not view Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people.

ABBAS, TOO, needed to gain legitimacy from somewhere for his willingness to engage with Netanyahu, and then to enter into a government led by a right-wing politician, Bennett. Though he managed to squeak just past the electoral threshold and into the Knesset with four seats, Abbas’s conciliatory approach and his philosophy of engagement with the Right – even though the Palestinian issue remains far from being resolved – has not brought him widespread popularity on the Arab street.

His future, and that of his party, is believed to be very much dependent on the survival of the current government, for if the government were to fall now and elections called tomorrow, Ra’am would likely join Yamina, New Hope and Meretz as parties that may struggle just to make it back into the next Knesset.

And this is where the Abraham Accords come into play, and where Abbas was able to derive legitimacy for his steps.

If the United Arab Emirates could negotiate and eventually sign a deal not only with Israel, but with the right-wing Netanyahu, because of a realization that by so doing they are advancing the interests of their country, then why can’t an Israeli-Arab party cooperate with and even join an Israeli government, even one with a right-wing prime minister, if by so doing it can advance the interests of Israeli-Arabs?

If it is okay for the UAE, even though the Palestinian issue has not been resolved, to normalize ties with Israel because this will help it push back against Iran’s hegemonic regional designs, allow it to benefit from Israel’s technological, agricultural and intelligence prowess, and enable it to buy F35s from the US, then why is it equally not okay for an Arab party to deal with a right-wing Israeli government if this benefits the Israeli-Arab community.

Abbas realized that he who sits around the table, gets fed, and that if the Israeli-Arab community wants to get a fair share of the country’s resources – and not just thrown some scraps from the table from time to time – it needs to be around the cabinet table. And it must be willing to sit at that table even if it doesn’t like everything that the cook is dishing out for others.

For instance, Abbas and Ra’am will certainly come under criticism on the Arab street for continuing to sit in a government that this week reached a compromise with settlement leaders whereby the illegal outpost of Evyatar would not be demolished, but rather turned into an army encampment pending a survey of whether it is private Palestinian or state land, at which time it might become the site of a yeshiva.

Likewise, Ra’am will surely take heat if agrees to a compromise that will allow the coalition to extend by another year the Family Reunification Law preventing Palestinian males under the age of 35 and females under the age of 25 from living with their Israeli spouses inside the Green Line.

In both cases, the party will be asked how it could lend its hand to a government that carries out such measures.

Here, too, Abbas can gain cover from the United Arab Emirates and the other Abraham Accords countries that have carried on with their normalization with Israel despite May’s mini-war in Gaza.

It is no small thing that Lapid went to the UAE – or that Abu Dhabi welcomed him – just a month after Israel fought Hamas. Moreover, the Emirati hosts made it clear throughout the visit that the Gaza conflict was not going to impact the burgeoning ties. Why not? Because those ties are good for the UAE.

So if the UAE is not going to let an 11-day war – during which 256 Palestinians were killed and the Gaza Strip devastated by Israeli firepower – torpedo its relations with the Jewish state, then does Ra’am need to bolt the coalition because of the government’s compromises over Evyatar or the Family Reunification Law?

Lapid and bin Zayed, when they wrote of the transformational potential of UAE-Israel ties, had in mind greater regional developments, hoping that the success in the ties between Israel and the UAE will impact attitudes around the region.

Where that potential seems to have been felt most strongly, however, was not in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, but rather in places like Abbas’s home town of Maghar and among the Bedouin in the Negev – the bedrock of Ra’am’s political support – who stand to benefit the most from the party’s joining the coalition, since the government has pledged to recognize three unrecognized Bedouin villages in the Negev.

On the surface, Lapid’s visit to Abu Dhabi and coalition developments this week seem to have taken place in isolation. But they did not. There is a line that connects those two distant dots: The Abraham Accords and Ra’am’s membership in this coalition.

耶路撒冷新政府保持以色列對阿聯酋的熱情

外交事務：變化帶來不確定性，但外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德 (Yair Lapid) 決心在他的阿布扎比​​和迪拜之行中表明，他全力支持與阿聯酋的新關係。

通過LAHAV哈爾科夫

2021 年 7 月 1 日 22:14

週三，在以色列駐迪拜領事館落成典禮上，外交部長 Yair Lapid 和阿聯酋人工智能國務部長 Omar Sultan Al Olama 剪彩。

（圖片來源：SHLOMI AMSALEM/GPO）

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新政府，尤其是 12 年來第一次有了新總理的政府，帶來了廣泛領域的不確定性，從警務到 COVID-19 限制再到無薪休假限制，外交政策也不例外。

在這方面，從一開始似乎最確定的是，當這個政府近三週前上台時，外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德（Yair Lapid）正如他的 Yesh Atid 黨的口號所說，“來做出改變”。拉皮德計劃成為一名全職外交部長，並在與總理納夫塔利·貝內特協商並在他的祝福下領導大多數外交政策事務。他打算對國家的外交政策產生變革性的影響——事實上，他有任何外交政策意圖是一個巨大的變化。

畢竟，前總理本雅明·內塔尼亞胡完全主宰了以色列的國際關係十多年，他在國家安全委員會的心腹，甚至前摩薩德首長約西·科恩為他做了很多工作，同時極少使用外交部和使其缺乏急需的預算。

不可否認，內塔尼亞胡在國際戰線上取得了許多成功，儘管他的管理風格非常集中且經常混亂，依靠的是他強大的個人智慧和技能，而不是外交部的許多外交政策專業人士。然而，他的弱點之一——這是一個人圍繞著這麼多事情的明顯後果——是他達到目標後的跟進。

其中一個例子是亞伯拉罕協議，即以色列與阿拉伯聯合酋長國之間的和平與正常化協議，其次是巴林、蘇丹和摩洛哥。

與阿聯酋和巴林的協議於 9 月在白宮南草坪上大張旗鼓地簽署。九個月後，唯一訪問過四個亞伯拉罕協議國家中的任何一個的部長是蘇丹的前情報部長伊萊科恩。沒有人訪問過阿聯酋，這是亞伯拉罕協議的關鍵。

原因是內塔尼亞胡想先走。多位部長被邀請參加會議或簽署協議，內塔尼亞胡將他們全部阻止。他試圖訪問五次，但每次都被阻止，三次是由於 COVID 限制的增加，一次是因為它是阿聯酋的國定假日。阿聯酋取消了他最後一次訪問的嘗試，因為就在今年大選的前幾天，內塔尼亞胡說亞伯拉罕協議和阿聯酋的投資是阿布扎比王儲穆罕默德·本·扎耶德對內塔尼亞胡的信心的體現。

儘管阿布扎比人認為內塔尼亞胡的言論不合時宜，但正如拉皮德本週所說，他是《亞伯拉罕協議》的“建築師”，而且很明顯，阿聯酋人不確定在又一次以色列大选和以色列大選之間的情況如何。貝內特掌舵。

阿聯酋外交部長阿卜杜拉·本·扎耶德本週在接受 Walla 和 Axios 採訪時說：“我擔心以色列人將經歷一個向內看並浪費當前勢頭的階段。”

“但是，”他補充道，“我認為拉皮德給任何人的第一個電話是給我的……以色列新政府同樣令人興奮，這告訴我，這是一種更廣泛的政治信念，並且願意投資於這種關係。”

當拉皮德週二啟程前往阿布扎比時，他的目標之一是向他遇到的官員保證，儘管人員、個性、管理風格和政策發生了所有變化，但他仍然熱衷於將內塔尼亞胡實現亞伯拉罕協議的成就納入其下個階段。

週四，拉皮德在給 Yesh Atid 支持者的時事通訊中寫道：“習慣上說人們‘隱藏他們的興奮’，但我們實際上努力不隱藏它。歷史性的時刻以令人眼花繚亂的速度一個接一個地發生……這就是和平的樣子，不像情感演講，而是現實生活中發生的實際事情。”

在同一份通訊中，拉皮德寫道，阿聯酋能源部長告訴他，“對我們來說，一切都基於個人風格。” 拉皮德說以色列人也是如此，並當場致電能源部長卡琳·阿爾哈拉爾，以便兩人計劃會面。

談到個人接觸，拉皮德和本扎耶德的會面是在 2020 年歐洲杯的英格蘭-德國比賽的同時，本扎耶德的保鏢向他們更新了比賽的進展情況。拉皮德支持英格蘭，本扎耶德也是，他的兄弟曼蘇爾本扎耶德，阿聯酋副總理，擁有曼城隊。對於那些不關注足球的人來說，英格蘭以 2-0 獲勝。

LAPID 完全符合阿聯酋尋求推進關係的方式。與內塔尼亞胡形成鮮明對比的是，內塔尼亞胡經常將以色列與遜尼派國家的關係描述為對抗伊朗的聯盟，任何有關伊斯蘭共和國的言論都被拋棄了。以色列人習慣於不斷從他們的領導人那裡聽到國防和安全問題，但這次有所不同。

相反，拉皮德的公開言論側重於雙邊關係的未來——即以色列和阿聯酋之間經濟和科學合作的機會——兩國之間的關係是如何開創性的，以及它們應該如何成為更多國家的榜樣。地區。

“以色列希望與所有鄰國和平相處，”拉皮德在以色列駐阿布扎比大使館的剪彩儀式上說。“我們今天站在這裡，是因為我們選擇和平而不是戰爭，選擇合作而不是衝突……協議是領導人簽署的，但和平是人民創造的。”

本著這種精神，第二天，在以色列駐迪拜領事館投入使用時，拉皮德說，它將成為“兩個有能力和想為彼此做出貢獻的人才之間對話的地方……一個像徵著我們有能力的地方共同思考，共同發展，共同改變世界。我們不接受現實，我們創造現實。我們兩國創造了不可思議的東西。”

這些與阿聯酋官員公開和閉門傳遞的信息完全相同。現在不是和其他國家談論問題的時候；他們說，這是關於以色列和阿聯酋共同努力幫助本國人民的潛力。

阿聯酋文化和青年部長 Noura Al Kaabi 說，她的國家和以色列“激勵該地區其他國家在通往更光明未來的道路上優先考慮和平與穩定……讓我們的孩子為更美好的未來做好準備。”

阿聯酋人工智能國務部長奧馬爾·奧拉馬說：“最終，以色列和阿聯酋之間的友好關係將在許多領域發展……我們將迎來雙邊合作的下一階段，這將成為許多人的榜樣。國家。”

拉皮德結束了他在這兩個最大酋長國的一系列會議，給人的印像是阿聯酋和以色列完全同步並為更美好的未來共同努力。他還吸引了當地媒體，他們氣喘吁籲地指出，他是名門望族的“媒體名人”，專注於商業，並提到自 9 月以來，兩國之間的貿易額已超過 22 億新謝克爾（6.7522 億美元）。

正如阿聯酋在去年首次公開外交關係時所設想的那樣，外交部長的訪問是兩國關係快速發展的開場白。預計在這個海灣國家會有一長串以色列部長，每個人都將簽署各自領域的雙邊協議，從農業到科學再到旅遊業。貝內特正在考慮參觀 2020 年迪拜世博會開幕式，以色列正在那裡建造一個展館。

當談到亞伯拉罕協議時，對以色列變革的擔憂似乎是沒有根據的，新政府已準備好將它們發揮到最大潛力。或者正如拉皮德本週在以色列駐阿布扎比大使館所說的那樣：“我們今天在這裡所做的並不是道路的盡頭；這是開始。”

New government in Jerusalem keeps Israel's enthusiasm for UAE

DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS: Changes bring uncertainty, but Foreign Minister Yair Lapid was determined to show on his trip to Abu Dhabi and Dubai that he is all in on the new relations with the UAE.

By LAHAV HARKOV

JULY 1, 2021 22:14

FOREIGN MINISTER Yair Lapid and Omar Sultan Al Olama, UAE minister of state for artificial intelligence, cut a ribbon during the inauguration ceremony of Israel’s consulate in Dubai, on Wednesday.

(photo credit: SHLOMI AMSALEM/GPO)

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A new government, especially one with a new prime minister for the first time in 12 years, brings with it uncertainty in a wide range of areas, from policing to COVID-19 restrictions to unpaid leave restrictions, and foreign policy is no exception.

On that front, what has seemed most certain from the outset, when this government came into office nearly three weeks ago, was that Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, as his Yesh Atid Party’s slogan goes, “came to make a change.” Lapid plans to be a full-time foreign minister and take the lead on most foreign policy matters, in consultation with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and with his blessing. He intends to have a transformative effect on the country’s foreign policy – and the fact that he has any foreign policy intentions at all is a big change.

After all, former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu completely dominated Israel’s international relations for more than a decade, with his confidants in the National Security Council or even former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen doing a lot of the work for him, while using the Foreign Ministry minimally and starving it of much-needed budgets.

It’s undeniable Netanyahu had many successes on the international front, despite his very centralized and often chaotic management style, relying on his formidable personal smarts and skills rather than the many foreign policy professionals in the Foreign Ministry. However, one of his weaknesses – which is the obvious consequence of having so many things revolve around one person – was the follow-through after he reached a goal.

One example of that was the Abraham Accords, the peace and normalization agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, followed by Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco.

The agreements with the UAE and Bahrain were signed with great fanfare on the White House’s South Lawn in September. Nine months later, the only minister to visit any of the four Abraham Accords countries was former intelligence minister Eli Cohen in Sudan. No one had visited the UAE, which was the linchpin of the Abraham Accords.

The reason was that Netanyahu wanted to go first. Multiple ministers were invited to conferences or to sign agreements, and Netanyahu blocked them all. He tried to visit five times and was thwarted each time, three times by rising COVID restrictions, once by it being a national holiday in the UAE. The Emiratis called off his final attempt to visit because it was just days before this year’s election and Netanyahu saying the Abraham Accords and UAE investments were an expression of Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed’s confidence in Netanyahu, specifically.

Despite the feeling in Abu Dhabi that Netanyahu’s remarks were intemperate, he was, as Lapid said this week, the “architect” of the Abraham Accords, and it was clear that the Emiratis were unsure where things stood between the yet-another Israeli election and Bennett taking the helm.

“I was concerned Israelis are going to go through a phase of looking inwards and wasting the current momentum,” UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed said in an interview with Walla and Axios this week.

“But,” he added, “I think Lapid’s first call to anyone was to me…. Having a new Israeli government which is equally excited tells me that this is a much broader political belief and willingness to invest in the relationship.”

When Lapid took off for Abu Dhabi on Tuesday, one of his goals was to reassure the officials he met that, despite all the changes in people, personality, management style and policies, he is enthusiastic about shepherding Netanyahu’s achievement of the Abraham Accords into its next stage.

On Thursday, Lapid wrote in a newsletter to Yesh Atid supporters: “It’s customary to say that people ‘hid their excitement,’ but we actually made an effort not to hide it. The historic moments came one after the other at a dizzying pace… this is what peace looks like, not like an emotional speech, but like something practical that happens in real life.”

In the same newsletter, Lapid wrote that the UAE’s energy minister told him that “for us, everything is based on a personal touch.” Lapid said the same is true for Israelis, and called Energy Minister Karin Alharrar on the spot, so the two could plan to meet.

And speaking of a personal touch, Lapid and Bin Zayed’s meeting was at the same time as the England-Germany game in Euro 2020, and Bin Zayed’s bodyguards updated them on how the game progressed. Lapid was rooting for England, and so was bin Zayed, whose brother Mansour bin Zayed, the UAE’s deputy prime minister, owns the Manchester City team. For those not paying attention to soccer, England won 2-0.

LAPID was fully aligned with how the UAE sought to present the relationship moving forward. In sharp contrast from Netanyahu, who often presented Israeli ties with Sunni states as an alliance against Iran, any talk about the Islamic Republic was jettisoned. Israelis are used to constantly hearing about defense and security issues from their leaders, but this was different.

Instead, Lapid’s public remarks focused on the future of bilateral ties – namely, the opportunities for economic and scientific cooperation between Israel and the UAE – how groundbreaking the relations between the countries are, and how they should serve as a model for more countries in the region.

“Israel wants peace with all of its neighbors,” Lapid said at the ribbon-cutting ceremony for the Israeli Embassy in Abu Dhabi. “We are standing here today because we chose peace over war, cooperation over conflict…. Agreements are signed by leaders, but peace is made by people.”

In that vein, the next day, dedicating the Israeli Consulate in Dubai, Lapid said it will be a place “of dialogue between two talented peoples who can and who want to contribute to one another…. A place that symbolizes our ability to think together, to develop together, to change the world together. We don’t accept reality, we create reality. Our two nations created the incredible.”

And those were the exact same messages that Emirati officials relayed, publicly and behind closed doors. This isn’t the time to talk about problems with other countries; it’s about the potential of Israel and the UAE working together to help their own people, they said.

UAE Culture and Youth Minister Noura Al Kaabi said her country and Israel “have inspired others in the region to prioritize peace and stability on the path to a brighter future… and work toward a region that embraces human dignity for all and inclusiveness and tolerance to prepare our children for a brighter future.”

UAE Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence Omar Al Olama said “ultimately, the warm ties between Israel and the UAE are slated to grow in many areas…. We will usher in a next phase of bilateral cooperation that will be a model to many countries.”

Lapid ended his battery of meetings in the two biggest emirates by giving an impression that the UAE and Israel are perfectly in sync and working together for a better future. He also charmed the local press, which breathlessly noted that he is a “media celebrity” with a famous family, focusing on business and mentioning that trade between the countries has topped NIS 2.2 billion ($675.22m.) since September.

The foreign minister’s trip is the opening salvo in what is expected to be a rapid advancement of the relations, just as the UAE had visualized when diplomatic ties were first made public last year. A long line of Israeli ministers is expected in the Gulf state, each set to sign bilateral agreements in their areas, from agriculture to science to tourism. Bennett is considering a visit to the opening of Expo 2020 in Dubai, where Israel is constructing a pavilion.

When it comes to the Abraham Accords, the concerns about change in Israel seem to be unwarranted, with the new government ready to push them to their maximum potential. Or as Lapid said at the Israeli Embassy in Abu Dhabi this week: “What we are doing here today is not the end of the road; it’s the beginning.”

伊朗深入挖空敘利亞

幕後：阿拉伯外交努力不太可能改變德黑蘭廣泛的基礎設施。

作者：喬納森·斯派爾

2021 年 7 月 1 日 22:01

4 月，敘利亞總統巴沙爾·阿薩德 (Bashar Assad) 的照片懸掛在大馬士革議會大樓外。

（圖片來源：YAMAM AL SHAAR/REUTERS）

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親伊朗民兵 襲擊美國在敘利亞東部的陣地之際，正值對敘利亞問題採取重大外交行動的時候。這些襲擊也生動地展示了當前敘利亞外交的核心問題。與西方結盟的重要阿拉伯國家與俄羅斯一道，正在尋求使阿薩德政權的國際地位正常化。這將涉及結束對該政權的孤立、重返國際論壇以及逐步放鬆制裁。

問題是，雖然這些使阿薩德地位“正常化”的努力在國際層面取得了一些進展，但敘利亞當地的局勢卻遠非正常。相反，敘利亞政權非常軟弱。外國勢力在敘利亞領土上維持著強大的軍事和政治結構，控制領土，無需尋求大馬士革名義政府的許可即可開展活動。其中最重要的是伊朗維持的結構，該結構於週一晚上在 Mayadeen 地區針對美國靠近 al-Omar 油田的陣地啟動。

目前的事態發展表明，敘利亞可能會出現某種“黎巴嫩化”或“伊拉克化”（如果這是一個詞的話）；即出現虛弱政府名存實亡並為國際所接受的局面。在這個脆弱的結構之下，強大、獨立的伊朗政治軍事力量將擁有行動自由、控制重要領土，並能夠利用名義上的中央政府作為其活動的有用外衣。

週一晚上的事件反映了伊朗對敘利亞東部重要地區的現有控制，以及敘利亞-伊拉克邊界在多大程度上仍然是虛構的。伊朗的襲擊是對美國在一天前對邊界兩側與伊朗結盟的民兵陣地進行打擊的回應。這些反過來是對使用無人機對美國在伊拉克和伊拉克庫爾德斯坦陣地進行的一系列民兵襲擊的回應。

據維護 Deirezor24 新聞網站的敘利亞記者 Omar Abu Layla 稱，伊朗對 al-Omar 的襲擊是從 Mayadeen 市地區發起的。根據奧馬爾·阿布·萊拉 (Omar Abu Layla) 的說法，美國的回應再次針對該城市及其周邊地區的陣地。Mayadeen 體現了伊朗在該地區的實力。它位於伊朗控制的領土上，從伊斯蘭革命衛隊控制的阿爾布卡邁勒/卡伊姆的國際邊界向北延伸。對 Mayadeen 及其南部和西部道路的控制使與伊朗結盟的部隊能夠在進一步向西前往黎巴嫩和以色列邊境時避開 al-Tanf 基地周圍的美國控制區。

這些地區的實地安全控制權掌握在伊朗人及其相關的阿拉伯民兵手中。阿薩德政權的軍隊只有在得到伊朗許可的情況下才能行動。除了軍事結構外，伊朗還尋求在該地區的經濟生活中站穩腳跟，並確保民眾的忠誠度。德黑蘭控制著該地區的重要石油設施。最重要的是，T2 站是基爾庫克-巴尼亞斯管道上的重要抽水設施，掌握在伊朗手中。它已經進入了代爾祖爾的部落結構，與強大的 al-Bagara 部落的元素保持著良好的關係。在該地區遜尼派阿拉伯人口中推廣什葉派伊斯蘭教的努力甚至不太成功。

與此同時，與美國結盟的敘利亞民主力量的消息人士對伊朗人試圖滲透幼發拉底河以東的自衛隊控制區表示擔憂。目前，該區域是伊朗/民兵實際控制整個敘利亞-伊拉克邊界的主要障礙。

伊朗的活動也延伸到代爾祖爾以西。Levant24 新聞網站最近的一份報告指出，“伊德利卜南部農村、哈馬東部農村和霍姆斯北部農村的大片地區”與伊朗結盟的民兵控制地區。該網站將（伊拉克）Nujaba、Ktaib 真主黨、（巴基斯坦）Zeinabiyun 和（阿富汗）Fatemiyun 民兵命名為參與的關鍵元素。

關於敘利亞的外交在很大程度上沒有考慮這些現實。俄羅斯目前正在努力實現通過大馬士革輸送所有國際援助的重要目標。莫斯科威脅要否決延長聯合國授權，以保持土耳其-敘利亞邊境的 Bab al Hawa 過境點開放。該過境點為居住在敘利亞西北部土耳其和遜尼派伊斯蘭控制區的 400 萬人提供重要物資。

俄羅斯為確保阿薩德政權在整個敘利亞的名義主權而做出的努力並不新鮮。然而，值得注意的是，現在更多的力量正在努力使該政權的立場“正常化”。具體而言，由阿拉伯聯合酋長國和埃及領導的新興阿拉伯外交聯盟同樣致力於恢復阿薩德的外交地位。埃及在內戰期間一直支持阿薩德，將他視為專制統治者，捍衛自己的政權免受伊斯蘭叛亂的影響。阿聯酋和巴林在 2018 年底重新開放了大使館。阿曼同樣在 2019 年底恢復了關係。科威特和約旦也重新開放了大使館。

埃及在 3 月份呼籲敘利亞重返阿拉伯聯盟，該聯盟的成員資格因內戰而被暫停十年。據地區媒體報導，阿聯酋已開始解凍在阿聯酋銀行中持有的敘利亞資金。海灣君主制主要關注遜尼派政治伊斯蘭教作為威脅。它將土耳其視為這一趨勢的主要支持者，從這個角度來看，阿薩德的敘利亞構成了堡壘。伊拉克從未斷絕與敘利亞的關係。

到目前為止，美國政府仍然反對這些活動。喬拜登總統保持其前任的立場，建議反對正常化和維持制裁的努力。然而，鑑於政府為恢復 JCPOA 所做的努力，這種立場的堅定性存在問題。前任政府對伊朗施加“最大壓力”的戰略與維持阿薩德敘利亞孤立的努力自然契合。美國目前的堅定立場是否得到維持還有待觀察。拜登政府未能根據凱撒法案指定任何新的製裁目標。上週，敘利亞商人薩默·福茲 (Samer Foz) 控制的兩家迪拜公司也解除了製裁。

那麼以色列在這一切中處於什麼位置呢？該政權的外交孤立是繼續起訴以色列空襲伊朗在敘利亞的基礎設施的理想環境。這場運動旨在削弱和減緩伊朗的努力，大概是希望對伊朗在敘利亞的項目起到威懾作用，這種項目可以說是在黎巴嫩實現的。俄羅斯和阿拉伯進一步推進阿薩德地位“正常化”的努力，將對這場運動未來的可行性提出一個問號。有報導稱，作為這項努力的一部分，以色列和敘利亞政權官員之間在俄羅斯指導下進行了非正式接觸。

然而，以色列的規劃者可能會注意到這些各方無法和/或不願意遏製或阻止伊朗在敘利亞的項目不斷擴大的影響力和能力。阿薩德的“正常化”可能意味著以色列的嚴重並發症。在伊拉克和敘利亞參與對美國日益增長的叛亂的部隊沒有也不會接受阿薩德、俄羅斯或阿拉伯國家的指示。他們的努力不太可能僅靠外交手段而停止。

行動優化反對派：內塔尼亞胡計劃推翻政府

政治事務：內塔尼亞胡將自己展示為一個精力充沛的反對派領導人，但他正在冒險可能導致利庫德集團的叛亂。

通過GIL HOFFMAN

2021 年 7 月 1 日 23:26

利庫德集團領導人本雅明·內塔尼亞胡作為總理的能力無疑將永遠受到爭論。

但在他之前的頭銜中，他毫無疑問地證明了自己是反對派的有效領導者。

內塔尼亞胡以比任何人預期的更快的速度推翻了總理西蒙·佩雷斯和埃胡德·奧爾默特。他們的任期是以色列總理中任期最短的，他們每個人的離職方式都讓他們口中苦澀。

但在他作為反對派領導人的最後一個任期內，內塔尼亞胡得到了一對特別有效的助手的幫助：他的參謀長納夫塔利·貝內特和他的局長阿耶萊特·沙克德。

現在他們都不為他工作，這已經不是什麼秘密了。目前內塔尼亞胡的工作是試圖智勝他們兩個。

為此，內塔尼亞胡帶領反對派進行了為期兩週的通宵阻撓。他試圖讓他的對手筋疲力盡並使他的對手心慌意亂，同時將自己描繪成一個不知疲倦的勁量兔子，在以色列議會全體會議上整整一個晚上後，他在社交媒體上發布的視頻看起來很新鮮。自前一天下午 4 點以來，他一直待在全會後，於週二早上 7 點 10 分在推特上表達了他的喜悅。

大多數部長已經通過挪威法律退出議會，該法律允許部長從議會辭職，支持其政黨名單上的下一位候選人，如果他們離開內閣，則自費返回。但是貝內特和外交部長亞伊爾拉皮德仍然是以色列議會的成員，後者在對無休止的修正案進行了一個充滿投票的夜晚後立即飛往阿拉伯聯合酋長國進行了他的歷史性訪問。

內塔尼亞胡為自己作為反對黨領袖的成就感到自豪，儘管他還沒有擊敗在全會和議會委員會中擁有微弱多數的聯盟。以色列議會安排委員會的平局投票受到反對黨 MK 的歡迎，直到重新計票證明他們也失去了投票。

儘管取得了成功，利庫德集團本週在私下談話中警告稱，內塔尼亞胡冒了太多風險，犯了太多錯誤。他們說，對這些決定的憤怒仍然隱藏在表面之下，但最終可能會沸騰並在他自己的政黨中引起前總理的嚴重問題。

首先，並非每個利庫德集團 MK 都像內塔尼亞胡一樣對阻撓議案感到興奮。

前聯盟主席Miki Zohar告訴《耶路撒冷郵報》，只要需要，他準備整夜繼續投票。

“當我們承諾戰鬥時，我們是認真的，”佐哈爾說。“在上帝的幫助下，我們將贏得鬥爭並儘快推翻這個邪惡的政府。”

但一位前利庫德集團內閣部長在議會自助餐廳投票之間告訴郵報，內塔尼亞胡的議會戰略是“無稽之談”。

“我唯一的睡眠就是在以色列議會辦公室的沙發上睡了一個半小時​​，”他感嘆道。“我可以再做一周，也許兩週。但不可能像這樣持續一個多月。”

聯盟中的 MK 表示，下個月通過一項為期兩年的國家預算，將向利庫德集團證明，政府不會很快垮台，甚至會削弱反對派中最有活力的 MK 的動力。

內塔尼亞胡採取的第二個冒險步驟是公開羞辱利庫德集團，他們在白天或晚上的任何時間都錯過了全會上最無關緊要的投票。羞辱信息張貼在利庫德集團網站上，並在 Facebook 和 Twitter 以及利庫德集團活動家的 WhatsApp 群組中分享。

上週，被羞辱的 MK 是 Ofir Akunis、Fateen Mulla 和 Miri Regev，他們沒有很好地接受黨內的公眾批評。本週，前以色列議會發言人尤利·埃德爾斯坦 (Yuli Edelstein) 因大膽與拉皮德搭檔，使外交部長能夠在阿聯酋設立大使館和領事館而受到抨擊。

MK Avi Dichter 和 Mulla 再次感到羞恥，並被告知他們“對民族主義陣營造成了巨大傷害”。

一位蒙羞的 MKs 錯過了將妻子送往醫院的投票，他說他強調不公開抗議，因為他不希望他妻子的病情被公開。但私下里，他承認他對內塔尼亞胡非常生氣。

穆拉對他對利庫德集團的忠誠受到質疑，受到極大的侮辱。他毫不含糊地發了一條推文：“我出生在利庫德集團，我將死在利庫德集團。”

內塔尼亞胡採取的第三步激怒了其黨內的 MK，堅持要求該黨內所有其他 29 名 MK 投票反對一項阻止巴勒斯坦人與以色列阿拉伯人家庭團聚的法案，儘管利庫德集團每年都通過該法案，包括就在上個月的內閣。

此舉旨在向聯盟施加壓力，並突出其認為該法案對以色列安全至關重要的 MK 與 Meretz 和 Ra'am（阿拉伯聯合名單）中該法案的強烈反對者之間的內部分歧。事實證明，這種壓力確實有效，因為由於缺乏支持，對該法案的投票已被推遲五次。

但曾任以色列安全局局長的迪希特公開競選支持該法案，並試圖爭取利庫德集團支持他。MK Yuval Steinitz 表示他也想投票支持該法案，但如果決定反對該法案，他將尊重派系紀律。

Dichter 沒有做出這樣的承諾，稱他還沒有準備好放棄。他就此事與內塔尼亞胡會面了近一個小時，內塔尼亞胡會面後立即向聯盟提出妥協方案。

他指責內塔尼亞胡將狹隘的政治置於以色列的安全之上。其他利庫德集團 MKs 私下指責內塔尼亞胡更糟。

在聯盟在幾分鐘內公開拒絕的妥協中，內塔尼亞胡提出讓利庫德集團 MK 投票將當前的家庭團聚條例延長兩個月，以換取聯盟支持通過更強有力的移民法。

內塔尼亞胡採取的第四步是在反對黨領導人會議上向媒體宣布妥協，而不是先私下告訴利庫德集團。

Regev 和前以色列國防軍副參謀長 MK Yoav Gallant 批評內塔尼亞胡在沒有更新 MK 的情況下通過新聞界提出妥協。

“我們決定反對它，”Regev 說。“我們需要先投反對票。”

內塔尼亞胡採取的第五步，激怒了他黨內的 MK 實際上是五個步驟中的第一個，但憤怒仍然是生的。他提議輪換其他四個政黨的領導人擔任總理，但沒有向利庫德集團的任何人提出任何認真的提議。

Shas 領導人 Arye Deri 告訴以色列議會全體會議，這些提議是向 MK 的 Yariv Levin、Steinitz 和 Dichter 提出的，他們可能是內塔尼亞胡的弗拉基米爾普京的德米特里梅德韋傑夫（臨時傀儡領導人）。三人都表示，沒有人親自向他們提出過這樣的提議。

利庫德集團的一位消息人士稱，這些名字被提供給了貝內特和新希望黨領袖吉迪恩·薩爾，他們只同意斯坦尼茨，因為他們知道斯坦尼茨很固執，不能成為任何人的傀儡。

甚至親內塔尼亞胡的報紙以色列 Hayom 週四也報導說，利庫德集團對內塔尼亞胡感到憤怒。前部長們在“利庫德利庫德的利器即將出爐”的標題下抱怨說內塔尼亞胡沒有什麼可給予的，沒有工作也沒有預算。

“黨內沒有人認為他真的關心他們，”前利庫德集團部長和 MK 告訴該報。

就在聯盟將分裂黨派作為首要任務時，對內塔尼亞胡的這種憤怒正潛伏著。週一晚上，一讀通過了一項法案，該法案將使四名 MK 脫離黨派，組建新派系。現行法律要求至少有三分之一的當事人——在利庫德集團的案例中為 10 MK——才能實現這一目標。

聯盟中的 MK 承認他們從利庫德集團吸引四名 MK 的希望不大。但他們表示，通過該法案將在內塔尼亞胡黨內造成更多的不信任和懷疑。前利庫德集團 MK 和現任新希望派領導人沙倫哈斯克爾表示樂觀。

“我們相信，在一個月的時間裡，[Likud MKs] 將理解他們被困在反對派，並準備加入聯盟，”她說。

如果發生這種情況，內塔尼亞胡作為反對派領導人的實力將不再是毋庸置疑的。

Operation Optimize the Opposition: Netanyahu's plan to bring gov't down

POLITICAL AFFAIRS: Netanyahu is presenting himself as an opposition leader with endless energy, but he is taking risks that could lead to rebellions in Likud.

By GIL HOFFMAN

JULY 1, 2021 23:26

Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu’s prowess as prime minister will undoubtedly be debated forever.

But he has unquestionably proven himself an effective leader of the opposition during the previous times he has held the title.

Netanyahu brought down prime ministers Shimon Peres and Ehud Olmert much quicker than anyone could have expected. Their terms were among the shortest of Israel’s prime ministers, and they each left office in a way that left a bitter taste in their mouths.

But in his last term as opposition leader, Netanyahu had the benefit of a pair of especially effective aides: His chief of staff, Naftali Bennett, and his bureau chief, Ayelet Shaked.

It is no secret that neither of them work for him now. It is currently Netanyahu’s job to try to outsmart the two of them.

To that end, Netanyahu has led the opposition through two weeks of all-night filibusters. He has tried to wear out and fluster his opponents, while portraying himself as an indefatigable Energizer Bunny who posts videos on social media looking fresh after a full night in the Knesset plenum. He tweeted his joy at 7:10 a.m. Tuesday after staying in the plenum since 4 p.m. the previous day.

Shaked and most of the ministers have quit the Knesset via the Norwegian Law, which allows ministers to resign from the parliament in favor of the next candidate on their party’s list and return at their expense if they leave the cabinet. But Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid remain Knesset members, and the latter flew to his historic visit in the United Arab Emirates immediately after a night full of voting on endless amendments.

Netanyahu is proud of his accomplishments as opposition leader, even though he has not yet defeated the coalition, which enjoys a razor-thin majority in the plenum and the Knesset committees. A tie vote in the Knesset Arrangements Committee was applauded by opposition MKs, until a recount proved they had lost that vote, too.

Despite his successes, Likud MKs warned this week in private conversations that Netanyahu is taking too many risks and making too many mistakes. They said anger over these decisions remain under the surface but could eventually boil over and cause the former prime minister serious problems in his own party.

First of all, not every Likud MK is as excited about the filibusters as Netanyahu.

Former coalition chairman Miki Zohar told The Jerusalem Post that he is ready to go on voting all night for as long as it takes.

“When we promised to fight, we meant every word,” Zohar said. “With God’s help, we will win our struggle and topple this evil government as soon as possible.”

But a former Likud cabinet minister told the Post between votes in the Knesset cafeteria that Netanyahu’s parliamentary strategy was “nonsense.”

“My only sleep was for an hour and a half on the couch in my office in the Knesset,” he lamented. “I can do this for another week, maybe two. But there is no way it’s going on like this for more than a month.”

MKs in the coalition said passing a two-year state budget next month would prove to Likud MKs that the government will not be falling any time soon and take away the motivation of even the most energetic MKs in the opposition.

The second risky step Netanyahu has taken is publicly shaming Likud MKs who miss even the most irrelevant votes in the plenum at any time of day or night. The shaming messages are posted on the Likud website and shared on Facebook and Twitter, as well as in Likud activists’ WhatsApp groups.

Last week, the MKs shamed were Ofir Akunis, Fateen Mulla and Miri Regev, who did not take the public criticism from inside her party well. This week, former Knesset speaker Yuli Edelstein was slammed for having the chutzpah to pair off with Lapid to enable the foreign minister to dedicate an embassy and consulate in the UAE.

MKs Avi Dichter and Mulla again were shamed and told they “caused great harm to the nationalist camp.”

One of the shamed MKs, who missed a vote to take his wife to the hospital, said he made a point of not protesting publicly, because he did not want his wife’s condition to be revealed to the public. But privately, he admitted he was very angry at Netanyahu.

Mulla was greatly insulted that his loyalty to the Likud was questioned. He made a point of tweeting unambiguously: “I was born in Likud, and I will die in Likud.”

The third step Netanyahu took that has angered MKs in his party is insisting that all of the other 29 MKs in the party vote against a bill preventing family reunification of Palestinians with Israeli-Arabs, even though the Likud has passed the bill every year, including in the cabinet just last month.

The move is intended to put pressure on the coalition and highlight its internal divides between MKs who see the bill as essential for Israeli security and strong opponents of the bill in Meretz and Ra’am (United Arab List). That pressure has indeed proven effective as voting on the bill has been postponed five times, due to a lack of support.

But Dichter, who is a former head of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), has publicly campaigned in favor of the bill and tried to woo Likud MKs to his side. MK Yuval Steinitz has said he also wants to vote for the bill but would respect faction discipline if a decision was made to oppose it.

Dichter has made no such promise, saying he is not ready to give up yet. He met for close to an hour on the matter with Netanyahu, who immediately proposed a compromise to the coalition after they met.

He accused Netanyahu of putting petty politics ahead of Israel’s security. Other Likud MKs privately accused Netanyahu of worse.

In the compromise, which the coalition publicly rejected within minutes, Netanyahu offered to have Likud MKs vote to extend the current family reunification ordinance by two months in return for the coalition backing the passage of a stronger immigration law.

The fourth step Netanyahu took was announcing that compromise to the media at a meeting of opposition party leaders, instead of telling the Likud MKs privately first.

Regev and MK Yoav Gallant, a former IDF deputy chief of staff, criticized Netanyahu for offering the compromise via the press without updating the MKs.

“We decided that we were going against it,” Regev said. “We need to vote against it first.”

The fifth step Netanyahu has taken that angered MKs in his party was actually the first of the five chronologically, but the anger is still raw. He offered a rotation as prime minister to the leaders of four other parties but made no serious offer to anyone in Likud.

Shas leader Arye Deri told the Knesset plenum that such offers were made to MKs Yariv Levin, Steinitz and Dichter, who could have been the Dmitry Medvedev (temporary puppet leader) to Netanyahu’s Vladimir Putin. All three said no one made such an offer to them personally.

One source in Likud said the names were offered to Bennett and New Hope leader Gideon Sa’ar, who agreed only to Steinitz, because they knew Steinitz was stubborn and could not be anyone’s puppet.

Even the pro-Netanyahu newspaper Israel Hayom reported on Thursday that there is anger in Likud at Netanyahu. Under the headline “the knives are coming out in Likud,” former ministers complained that Netanyahu has nothing to give, no jobs and no budget.

“There is no one in the party who thinks he really cares about them,” a former Likud minister and MK told the paper.

This anger at Netanyahu is lurking just when the coalition is making splitting the party its top priority. On Monday night, a bill passed in its first reading that would enable four MKs to break off from a party to form a new faction. The current law requires at least a third of the party – 10 MKs in the Likud’s case – for that to happen.

MKs in the coalition admitted they had little hope for attracting four MKs from Likud. But they said passing the bill would create more mistrust and suspicion in Netanyahu’s party. Former Likud MK and current New Hope faction head Sharren Haskel expressed optimism.

“We believe that in a month’s time [Likud MKs] will comprehend that they are stuck in the opposition and will prepare to join the coalition,” she said.

If that happens, Netanyahu’s prowess as leader of the opposition would no longer be unquestionable.

利庫德集團破壞貝內特的努力將黨置於國家之上

中以色列：越來越多的新反對派領導人不同意貝內特政府合法化和破壞其工作的政策。

作者：AMOTZ ASA-EL

2021 年 7 月 1 日 21:57

利庫德集團領袖和前總理本雅明內塔尼亞胡本週出席了以色列議會會議。

（圖片來源：MARC ISRAEL SELLEM/耶路撒冷郵報）

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隨著前海軍陸戰隊肯諾頓的下巴被前海軍陸戰隊肯諾頓打破，以及裁判的分裂決定最終，拳擊傳奇人物穆罕默德阿里對他意外的失敗做出了回應：“我們都必須在生活中接受失敗。”

阿里在這一點上是對的，但接受失敗很難，失敗的人往往會拒絕。這就是新反對派正在發生的事情，他們對失去權力和特權的反應是幼稚的、反愛國的和毀滅性的，對他們和他們發誓要為之服務的國家來說都是如此。

否認主義在新政府誕生的那天浮出水面。

納夫塔利·貝內特總理在就職演說中迎接的質問合唱團旨在說服所發生的事情並非真的發生；利庫德集團和內塔尼亞胡並沒有真正輸掉。他們怎麼可能？

顯然是有預謀的，這種嘈雜的信息是有兩個目標的宣戰，一個是道德的，另一個是政治的：在道德上，使貝內特及其政府合法化，在政治上，破壞他們的議會工作。

事實證明，破壞政府工作的企圖是如此強烈，以至於利庫德集團試圖阻止每年更新的限制與以色列阿拉伯人結婚的巴勒斯坦人入籍的規定。

別介意這個限制的實質；在這次討論中重要的是，在整個內塔尼亞胡年間，這項規定一直是利庫德集團自己政策的一部分。即便如此，利庫德集團現在開始加入反對派，破壞其重建。

換句話說，利庫德集團現在破壞貝內特的衝動比它自己聲明的信念更強烈，以至於它準備向它懷疑有恐怖主義意圖的人敞開大門。黨第一，國家第二。

這不是議會反對派的運作方式。

是的，許多法案只是因為政府提出而遭到反對，但在涉及國家安全等問題時，黨派考慮被擱置一旁。這就是本傑明·內塔尼亞胡在 1996 年自殺性爆炸事件中作為反對派領導人所做的事情。“西蒙 [佩雷斯]，與他們戰鬥！” 他告訴總理。“我們會和你在一起的！”

反對派的工作是辯論聯盟的計劃並投票反對其法案，但其工作不是向人民撒謊說他們擁有“欺詐政府”。什麼欺詐？貝內特試圖加入一個右翼聯盟，但內塔尼亞胡未能實現。那時貝內特決定阻止另一次提前選舉，這符合他的一項關鍵選舉承諾。這是愛國的選擇。相比之下，他的反對派並不愛國。然而，這是幼稚和歇斯底里的。

MK Avraham Michaeli (Shas) 表示，貝內特成立委員會調查梅隆山災難意味著他的政府“在受害者的鮮血上跳舞”。MK Meir Porush (UTJ) 對安排委員會主席 Idit Silman 大喊大叫，“你表現得像個小女孩”，因為她叫他點菜。

聽證會宗教事務部長馬坦·卡哈納（亞米娜）詢問貝內特的極端正統派詰問者，如果他們與貝內特不同，從來沒有機會說出戰前祈禱——MK Dudi Amsalem（利庫德集團）的回答是：“ Bennett 的拉比是 Yair Lapid。”

那麼，這就是新反對派對選民裁決的回應，慶祝失敗、逃避現實和自以為是，拒絕意識到說內塔尼亞胡應該被取代的政黨贏得了 61 個議會席位，其餘的，包括亞米娜在內，贏了 59 場。

像所有哀悼者一樣，新反對派成員將在適當的時候通過憤怒、討價還價和沮喪從拒絕到接受。事實上，有些已經過了否認階段。

一位是前衛生部長尤利·埃德爾斯坦 (Yuli Edelstein)，他沒有否認 KAN 電視台的報導，即他在一個封閉的論壇上說，“必須更換內塔尼亞胡”，並且他將與他競爭利庫德集團的領導權。

另一個是前耶路撒冷市長尼爾巴爾卡特，他攻擊內塔尼亞胡，因為內塔尼亞胡沒有讓替代的利庫德集團候選人與吉迪恩薩爾建立右翼聯盟。

另一個沒有否認的利庫德派是前內部安全部長阿維·迪希特，他說他將與內塔尼亞胡競爭，並批評他在與貝內特的交接會議上只用了 30 分鐘。

這些挑戰者中的任何一個能否擊敗內塔尼亞胡是一個單獨的問題。現在重要的是他們在告訴同事大多數新反對派成員似乎無法說出的兩個詞時表現出的清醒：我們輸了。

同樣清醒且更令人印象深刻的是，吉拉德·埃爾丹大使提出繼續擔任以色列駐聯合國大使。

埃爾丹的提議意味著，這位在內塔尼亞胡政府服務了11年的人不僅承認內塔尼亞胡的失敗，而且不僅拒絕加入使班尼特統治合法化和破壞其統治的運動，而且還主動提出為其服務。他提供這個是正確的。這是基本的愛國主義。

果爾達·梅厄和伊扎克·拉賓的駐美大使辛查·迪尼茨在梅納赫姆·貝京的領導下留在華盛頓，忠誠地為他服務，並與他一起參加了戴維營和談。工黨的 Avraham Shochat 於 1990 年在他的政黨離開政府後成為以色列議會財政委員會主席，而 Yitzhak Shamir 和他的合作夥伴無法就 Shochat 的繼任者達成一致。

後來擔任拉賓、佩雷斯和埃胡德巴拉克財政部長的肖查特繼續留任並有效地為利庫德集團政府服務。是的，他屬於反對派，但他從未想過破壞民選政府的工作。

埃爾丹也在做同樣的事情，因此加入了越來越多的利庫德集團領導人，他們知道真相，那就是選舉沒有被偷走，天沒有塌下來，貝內特是法律和正義的總理，失敗了，正如穆罕默德·阿里指出的那樣，是生活的一部分。

作家的暢銷書 Mitzad Ha'ivelet Ha'yehudi（猶太愚蠢遊行，Yediot Sefarim，2019 年）是一部從古代到現代的猶太人領導權的修正主義歷史。

Likud's efforts to sabotage Bennett put party over country

MIDDLE ISRAEL: The policy of delegitimizing the Bennett government and sabotaging its work is disagreeable to a growing number of the new opposition’s leaders.

By AMOTZ ASA-EL

JULY 1, 2021 21:57

LIKUD LEADER and former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends a Knesset meeting this week.

(photo credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM/THE JERUSALEM POST)

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With his jaw broken by former Marine Ken Norton, and with the referees’ split decision final, boxing legend Muhammad Ali responded to his unexpected defeat: “We all have to take defeats in life.”

Ali was right on that one, but accepting defeat is hard, and defeated people often turn to denial. That is what is happening to the new opposition, whose response to its loss of power and its perks has been childish, anti-patriotic and ruinous, for them and for the country they are sworn to serve.

The denialism surfaced the day the new government was born.

The heckling choir that greeted Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in his inaugural speech was designed to convince that what had happened didn’t really happen; that Likud and Netanyahu didn’t really lose. How could they?

Obviously premeditated, that cacophony’s message was a declaration of war with two aims, one moral the other political: morally, to delegitimize Bennett and his government, and politically, to sabotage their parliamentary work.

The quest to undermine the government’s work proved so intense that Likud tried to thwart the annual renewal of the regulation that limits naturalization of Palestinians who marry Israeli Arabs.

Never mind this restriction’s substance; what matters in terms of this discussion is that this regulation has been part of Likud’s own policy throughout the Netanyahu years. Even so, Likud now set out to join the opposition in torpedoing its renewal.

In other words, Likud’s urge to sabotage Bennett is now stronger than its own stated convictions, so much so that it is prepared to fling the country’s doors open to people it suspects of terrorist intentions. Party first, country second.

THIS IS not how parliamentary opposition is meant to work.

Yes, many bills are opposed just because the government proposes them, but when it comes to issues like national security, partisan considerations are set aside. That is what Benjamin Netanyahu did as leader of the opposition during the suicide bombings of 1996. “Shimon [Peres], fight them!” he told the prime minister. “We’ll be with you!”

The opposition’s work is to debate the coalition’s plans and to vote against its bills, but its job is not to lie to the people that they have “a government of fraud.” What fraud? Bennett tried to join a right-wing coalition, but Netanyahu failed to deliver one. That’s when Bennett decided to prevent another snap election, in line with one of his key election promises. It was the patriotic choice. His opposition, by contrast, is not patriotic. It is, however, childish and hysterical.

MK Avraham Michaeli (Shas) said Bennett’s establishment of a commission inquiry into the Mount Meron Disaster means his government is “dancing on the victims’ blood.” MK Meir Porush (UTJ) hollered at Arrangements Committee chairwoman Idit Silman, “You are behaving like a little girl” because she called him to order.

Hearing Religious Affairs Minister Matan Kahana (Yamina) ask Bennett’s ultra-Orthodox hecklers how they think they can preach to Bennett about faith if they, unlike him, never got to say the Prayer Before Battle – MK Dudi Amsalem’s (Likud) reply was: “Bennett’s rabbi is Yair Lapid.”

Such, then, is the new opposition’s response to the voters’ verdict, a celebration of sore losing, escapism and self-righteousness underpinned by a refusal to realize that the parties that said Netanyahu should be replaced won 61 Knesset seats, and the rest, including Yamina, won 59.

LIKE ALL mourners, the new opposition’s members will in due course travel from denial to acceptance via anger, bargaining and depression. Some, in fact, are already past the denial phase.

One is former health minister Yuli Edelstein, who has not denied a KAN TV report that he told a closed forum, “Netanyahu must be replaced,” and that he will run against him for Likud’s leadership.

Another is former Jerusalem mayor Nir Barkat, who attacked Netanyahu for not having let an alternative Likud candidate secure a right-wing coalition with Gideon Sa’ar.

Another Likudnik not living in denial is former internal security minister Avi Dichter, who said he will run against Netanyahu, and while at it criticized him for having dedicated a mere 30 minutes for his handover meeting with Bennett.

Whether any of these challengers can defeat Netanyahu is a separate question. What matters right now is the sobriety they display in telling their colleagues the two words that most of the new opposition’s members seem unable to utter: We lost.

Equally sober, and even more impressive, has been Ambassador Gilad Erdan’s offer to stay on as Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations.

Erdan’s proposal means that the man who served in Netanyahu’s governments for 11 years not only recognizes Netanyahu’s defeat, and not only refuses to join the campaign to delegitimize and sabotage Bennett’s rule, he is offering to serve it. And he is right to offer this. It’s basic patriotism.

Golda Meir’s and Yitzhak Rabin’s ambassador to the US, Simcha Dinitz, remained in Washington under Menachem Begin, served him loyally, and also joined him at the Camp David peace talks. Labor’s Avraham Shochat found himself in 1990 chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee after his party left the government, while Yitzhak Shamir and his partners couldn’t agree on Shochat’s successor.

Shochat, who later was finance minister for Rabin, Peres and Ehud Barak, stayed on and served that Likud government efficiently. Yes, he belonged to the opposition, but sabotaging the elected government’s work never crossed his mind.

Erdan is doing the same thing, and thus joins the growing number of Likud leaders who know the truth, which is that the election has not been stolen, the sky has not fallen, Bennett is prime minister by both law and justice, and defeat, as Muhammad Ali noted, is part of life.

The writer’s bestselling Mitzad Ha’ivelet Ha’yehudi (The Jewish March of Folly, Yediot Sefarim, 2019) is a revisionist history of the Jewish people’s leadership from antiquity to modernity.

Iran digs deep in hollowed-out Syria

BEHIND THE LINES: Arab diplomatic efforts unlikely to shift Tehran’s extensive infrastructure.

By JONATHAN SPYER

JULY 1, 2021 22:01

A PICTURE of Syria’s President Bashar Assad hangs outside the parliament building in Damascus in April.

(photo credit: YAMAM AL SHAAR/REUTERS)

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The attacks by pro-Iran militias on US positions in eastern Syria come at a time of significant diplomatic action on the Syrian file. These attacks also graphically demonstrate the problem at the core of the current diplomacy over Syria. Significant Western-aligned Arab states, along with Russia, are seeking to normalize the international position of the Assad regime. This would involve the ending of the isolation of the regime, its return to international forums, and the gradual easing of sanctions.

The problem is that while these efforts to “normalize” Assad’s status are making some headway on the international level, the situation on the ground in Syria is far from normal. Rather, the Syrian regime is profoundly weak. Foreign powers maintain powerful military and political structures on Syrian soil, controlling territory without any requirement to seek the permission of the nominal government in Damascus for their activities. Most significant of these is the structure maintained by Iran, which was activated on Monday night in the Mayadeen area against US positions close to al-Omar oilfield.

The current direction of events points to the prospect of a kind of “Lebanonization” or “Iraqification” (if that is a word) of Syria; that is, the emergence of a situation in which a weak government in name only exists and is accepted internationally. Beneath this flimsy structure, a powerful, independent Iranian political-military capacity will have freedom of action, control significant territory, and be able to use the nominal central government as a useful cloak for its activities.

Monday night’s events reflect the already existing Iranian hold on significant parts of eastern Syria, and the extent to which the Syrian-Iraqi border remains something of a fiction. The Iranian attacks came in response to US strikes on Iran-aligned militia positions on either side of the border a day earlier. These in turn were a response to a series of militia attacks using drones on US positions in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.

According to Omar Abu Layla, a Syrian journalist who maintains the Deirezzor24 news site, the Iranian attacks on al-Omar were launched from the area of Mayadeen city. The US response, again according to Omar Abu Layla, targeted positions in and around that city. Mayadeen exemplifies the strength of the Iranian hold in this area. It is located along a contiguous stretch of Iranian-controlled territory extending north from the IRGC-controlled international border at Albu Kamal/al-Qaim. Control of Mayadeen and the roads to its south and west enable Iran-aligned forces to avoid the US controlled zone around al-Tanf base when heading further west toward Lebanon and toward the border with Israel.

Security control on the ground in these areas is in the hands of the Iranians and their associated Arab militias. The forces of the Assad regime are able to operate only with Iranian permission. Alongside the military structures, Iran is seeking to entrench itself in the economic life of the area, and to secure the loyalty of the population. Tehran controls significant oil facilities in this area. Most importantly, the T2 station, a vital pumping facility on the Kirkuk-Banyas pipeline, is in the hands of Iran. It has made some inroads into the tribal structures of Deir al-Zur, maintaining good relations with elements of the powerful al-Bagara tribe. Less successful efforts have even been made at promoting Shia Islam among the Sunni Arab population of this area.

Sources in the US-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces, meanwhile, express concern at efforts by the Iranians to penetrate the SDF area of control east of the Euphrates. At present, this zone is the main barrier to de facto Iranian/militia control of the entirety of the Syria-Iraq border.

IRANIAN ACTIVITY also extends west of Deir al-Zur. A recent report on the Levant24 news site identifies areas of Iran-aligned militia control in “large swaths of south rural Idlib, east rural Hama, and north rural Homs.” The site names the (Iraqi) Nujaba, Ktaib Hezbollah, (Pakistani) Zeinabiyun and (Afghan) Fatemiyun militias as the key elements engaged.

The diplomacy on Syria proceeds largely without reference to these realities. Russia is currently engaged in an effort to secure the important goal of channeling all international aid through Damascus. Moscow is threatening to veto the renewal of the UN mandate to keep the Bab al Hawa border crossing on the Turkish-Syrian border open. The crossing provides vital supplies to four million people living in the Turkish and Sunni Islamist controlled zone in northwest Syria.

Russia’s efforts to secure the nominal sovereignty of the Assad regime throughout Syria are not new. Notably, however, additional forces are now engaged in the effort to “normalize” the regime’s position. Specifically, the emergent Arab diplomatic alignment led by the United Arab Emirates and Egypt is similarly committed to restoring Assad’s diplomatic status. Egypt supported Assad throughout the civil war, seeing him as an authoritarian ruler defending his regime against an Islamist insurgency. The UAE and Bahrain reopened their embassies at the end of 2018. Oman similarly restored relations at the end of 2019. Kuwait and Jordan have reopened their embassies.

Egypt in March called for Syria’s return to the Arab League, a decade after its membership was suspended in the wake of the civil war. The UAE, according to regional media reports, has begun to un-freeze Syrian funds held in Emirati banks. The Gulf monarchy is centrally concerned with Sunni political Islam as a threat. It sees Turkey as the main supporter of this trend, and from this point of view, Assad’s Syria constitutes a bulwark. Iraq never broke relations with Syria.

As of now, the US administration remains opposed to these activities. President Joe Biden has maintained the stance of his predecessor, advising against efforts at normalization and maintaining sanctions. Given the administration’s efforts at a return to the JCPOA, however, there are questions as to the firmness of this stance. The previous administration’s strategy of “maximum pressure” on Iran was a natural fit with an effort to maintain the isolation of Assad’s Syria. It remains to be seen if the current firm US stance is maintained. The Biden administration has failed to designate any new targets for sanctions under the Caesar Act. Sanctions were also lifted on two Dubai-based corporations controlled by Syrian businessman Samer Foz last week.

So where is Israel in all this? The diplomatic isolation of the regime is the ideal setting for the continued prosecution of Israel’s air campaign against the Iranian infrastructure in Syria. This campaign is designed to degrade and slow Iran’s efforts, presumably in the hope of reaching deterrence with the Iranian project in Syria, of a type which has arguably been achieved in Lebanon. Further advancement of the Russian and Arab efforts to “normalize” Assad’s status will raise a question mark over the future viability of this campaign. There have been reports of informal, Russian-directed contacts between Israel and Syrian regime officials as part of this effort.

Israeli planners, however, are likely to take note of the inability and/or unwillingness of these parties to curb or prevent the growing reach and capacities of the Iranian project in Syria. “Normalization” for Assad is likely to mean severe complications for Israel. The forces engaged in the growing insurgency against the US in Iraq and Syria do not and will not take instruction from Assad, from Russia or from the Arab states. Their efforts are unlikely to be halted by diplomacy alone.

突尼斯，阿拉伯之春唯一的成功故事，飽受警察暴行的困擾

公民要求結束長期過度使用武力。

作者：TARA KAVALER/媒體行

2021 年 7 月 1 日 16:32

突尼斯的抗議活動

（圖片來源：路透社）

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自 1 月以來，突尼斯各地斷斷續續地發生了反對警察暴行的抗議活動，最近幾週，抗議活動激增，尤其是在首都的工人階級地區。

6 月 8 日，32 歲的 Ahmed Ben Ammar 在警方拘留期間死亡，促使許多突尼斯人走上街頭。在其中一次抗議活動中，有人拍到身穿便服的警察在街中央毆打和剝光一名 15 歲男孩，加劇了局勢。

示威活動在當代突尼斯具有特殊地位，它是唯一因阿拉伯之春（一系列反對專制統治的抗議活動）而實現民主的國家。

“抗議活動是突尼斯民主的重要組成部分。抗議活動首先帶來了民主轉型，並繼續成為公民發表意見的主要途徑，”卡內基國際和平基金會中東項目高級研究員莎拉·耶克斯（Sarah Yerkes ）專門研究突尼斯，告訴媒體專線。

突尼斯 Al Kawakibi 民主過渡中心主任 Amine Ghali 認為，抗議活動已成為政治變革的關鍵。

“自 2010 年底以來，抗議活動是變革和轉型的驅動力，”他告訴媒體專線。“政客不願改變；因此這條街成為施壓的場所，無論是[茉莉花]革命[2010年12月至2011年1月]、憲法草案或推動經濟權利。”

公民希望通過示威活動來推動警察行為的實質性改進。

儘管自總統宰因·阿比丁·本·阿里 (Zine El Abidine Ben Ali) 被推翻以來的十年中，該國發生了巨大變化，但警務實踐仍然存在問題。

“自本阿里倒台以來，暴行的程度急劇下降，但在過去幾個月裡，我們目睹了代表警察的惡劣行為有所增加，部分原因是突尼斯政府沒有明確表示這種行為必須停止，”耶克斯說。

今天，警察暴力既是製度問題，也是政治問題。

“這是舊做法和文化的遺產，加上政府不願懲罰違法者或尋求立法改革，”加利說。

耶克斯同意。 她說：“今天，警察的暴行在很大程度上是由於受到強大警察工會保護的警察逍遙法外。” “儘管突尼斯公眾廣泛呼籲結束警察暴行，但遏制他們權力的立法努力失敗了。”

耶克斯表示，政治變革需要通過法律來懲罰警察的暴行，並削弱作為集體談判協議一部分的警員保護水平。

“立法者可以起草立法，限制警察工會的權力，並讓警察對毆打和折磨抗議者等法外行為負責，”她說。

“公民們一直在街頭要求進行此類改革——並且可以繼續這樣做。”

Tunisia, Arab Spring’s sole success story, plagued by police brutality

Citizens demand an end to the long-standing use of excessive force.

By TARA KAVALER/THE MEDIA LINE

JULY 1, 2021 16:32

Protests in Tunisia

(photo credit: REUTERS)

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Protests against police brutality have taken place throughout Tunisia on and off since January, and recent weeks have seen them proliferate, particularly in working-class areas of the capital.

The death of 32-year-old Ahmed Ben Ammar in police custody on June 8 prompted many Tunisians to take to the streets. During one of those protests, officers in civilian dress were filmed beating and stripping a 15-year-old boy in the middle of the street, inflaming the situation.

Demonstrations hold a special status in contemporary Tunisia, as the only country to achieve democracy as a result of the Arab Spring, a series of protests against despotic rule.

“Protests are an essential part of Tunisia’s democracy. Protests brought about the democratic transition in the first place and continue to be the primary avenue for citizens to make their voices heard,” Sarah Yerkes, a senior fellow in the Middle East Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who specializes in Tunisia, told The Media Line.

Amine Ghali, director of Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center in Tunis, argues that protests have become the key to political change.

“Since late 2010, protests are the driver for change and transformation,” he told The Media Line. “Politicians are reluctant to change; hence the street became the venue for pressure, whether it was the [Jasmine] Revolution [of December 2010-January 2011], the constitutional drafts or the push for economic rights.”

Citizens hope to use demonstrations to spur substantive improvement in police conduct.

While the country has changed dramatically in the decade since the overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, policing practices remain problematic.

“The level of brutality has decreased dramatically since the fall of Ben Ali, but over the past several months we have witnessed an uptick in egregious behavior on behalf of the police, in part because there is no clear signal from the Tunisian government that this behavior must stop,” Yerkes said.

Today, police violence is both an institutional and a political problem.

“It’s a legacy of old practices and culture combined with the government’s reluctance to punish offenders or seek legislative changes,” Ghali said.

Yerkes agrees. “Today, police brutality persists in large part due to the impunity of the police, who are protected by strong police unions,” she said. “Legislative efforts to curb their power have failed, despite widespread and vocal calls by the Tunisian public to end police brutality.”

Yerkes said political change would require, among other things, passing laws that penalize police brutality and weaken the level of protection officers receive as part of their collective bargaining agreement.

“Lawmakers can draft legislation that would curtail the powers of the police unions and would hold police officers accountable for extrajudicial actions such as beating and torturing protesters,” she said.

“Citizens have been in the streets demanding these sorts of reforms – and can continue to do so."

COVID：專家持懷疑態度，內塔尼亞胡呼籲 50 多歲的人接種第三種疫苗

本傑明·內塔尼亞胡要求衛生部長尼贊·霍洛維茨在 8 月開始為 50 歲以上的人口提供第三次助推器，聲稱頂級專家已告訴他這樣做。

作者：羅塞拉·特卡特

2021 年 7 月 1 日 22:56

特拉維夫南部疫苗接種中心的一名工作人員為一名外國人接種冠狀病毒疫苗。

（圖片來源：GUY YECHIELY）

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反對黨領袖本傑明·內塔尼亞胡（Benjamin Netanyahu）發表了一份致衛生部長尼贊·霍洛維茨（Nitzan Horowitz）的聲明，要求在 8 月份開始為 50 歲以上的人群接種第三種助推器，聲稱頂級專家已經告訴他了。然而，在接受《耶路撒冷郵報》採訪時，一些專家對這些提議表示保留。

在稱讚他的疫苗接種活動取得成功後，內塔尼亞胡說他曾與“世界上一些最優秀的專家”交談過，他認為“應該在 8 月初向成年人口（50 歲及以上）接種第三種疫苗。 9月底前完成任務。” 然而，在他發表聲明之前，以色列沒有一位著名的健康專家公開提出這一建議。

“我認為現在確定是否已經需要第三劑還為時過早，”巴伊蘭大學免疫學實驗室負責人西里爾科恩教授說。“我們需要收集更多關於當前感染的數據，並確定疫苗在多大程度上保護了由 delta 變體引起的症狀性疾病——這是目前以色列的主要毒株。”

科恩解釋說，根據國外的數據，mRNA 疫苗的效力持續時間超過幾個月，而且輝瑞 BioNtech 疫苗似乎對有症狀的疾病提供了約 88% 的保護，對住院治療的保護率為 96%。

“最近的一些數據還表明，mRNA 疫苗可能會誘導長壽命的免疫反應，”科恩進一步說。“此外，我們沒有重複注射的經驗，因此，如果我們要計劃第三劑，最好包括更新新變體。”

“在收集了有關當前感染的更多數據後，如果我們要檢測到疫苗對該變體的有效性有所降低，我們可能能夠計劃第三次注射，”他總結道。

“這個話題值得進一步分析，但可能這樣的舉動對 80 歲以上的人更有意義，”大衛多維奇說，並解釋說，有初步跡象表明，疫苗對老年人的保護下降得更快。

“但是，它正在調查中，需要進一步討論，”他指出。

COVID: Netanyahu calls for 3rd vaccine for over 50s, experts skeptical

Benjamin Netanyahu asked Health Minister Nitzan Horowitz to start giving a third booster to the 50+ population in August, claiming top experts have told him to do so.

By ROSSELLA TERCATIN

JULY 1, 2021 22:56

A worker at the south Tel Aviv vaccination center administers the coronavirus vaccine to a foreign national.

(photo credit: GUY YECHIELY)

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Opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu released a statement addressed to Health Minister Nitzan Horowitz asking to start vaccinating the population over 50 with a third booster already in August, claiming that top experts have told him so. However, speaking to The Jerusalem Post some experts expressed reservations at the proposals.

After praising the success of his vaccination campaign, Netanyahu said that he had spoken to "some of the best experts in the world" and he believes "that the third vaccine should be given to the adult population (50 and over) in early August in order to complete the task by the end of September." Before his statement however, no prominent health expert in Israel had come out publicly with this suggestion.

“I think it is a bit premature to determine if a third dose is already needed,” Prof. Cyrille Cohen, the head of the immunology lab at Bar-Ilan University said. “We need to gather more data about the current infection and to determine to what extent the vaccine is protecting from symptomatic disease caused by the delta variant - which is the dominant strain now in Israel.”

Cohen explained that based on data from abroad, the mRNA vaccine efficacy lasts longers than months and that it appears that the Pfizer BioNtech vaccine awards some 88% protection against symptomatic disease and 96% from hospitalization.

“Some recent data also show that mRNA vaccines may induce long lived immune response,” Cohen further said. “Also, we do not have experience with repetitive injections and thus, if we are to plan a third dose, it would be better if it were to include an update with the new variants.”

“After gathering more data on the current infections, if we are to detect some reduce effectiveness of the vaccine against the variant, we might be able to plan a third injections,” he concluded.

“The topic deserves further analysis, but probably such a move would be more relevant for those over 80,” Davidovitch said, explaining that there are preliminary indications that the protection to older individuals offered by the vaccine declines faster.

“However, it is under investigation, it will need be to be further discussed,” he noted.

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