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LW - Important open problems in voting by Closed Limelike Curves
Manage episode 426803930 series 3337129
内容由The Nonlinear Fund提供。所有播客内容(包括剧集、图形和播客描述)均由 The Nonlinear Fund 或其播客平台合作伙伴直接上传和提供。如果您认为有人在未经您许可的情况下使用您的受版权保护的作品,您可以按照此处概述的流程进行操作https://zh.player.fm/legal。
Link to original article
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Important open problems in voting, published by Closed Limelike Curves on July 2, 2024 on LessWrong. Strategy-resistance Identify, or prove impossibility, of a voting system which incentivizes 1. A strictly sincere ranking of all candidates in the zero-information setting, where it implements a "good" social choice rule such as the relative (normalized) utilitarian rule, a Condorcet social choice rule, or the Borda rule. 2. In a Poisson game or similar setting: a unique semi-sincere Nash equilibrium that elects the Condorcet winner (if one exists), similar to those shown for approval voting by Myerson and Weber (1993) and Durand et al. (2019). Properties of Multiwinner voting systems There's strikingly little research on multiwinner voting systems. You can find a table of criteria for single-winner systems on Wikipedia, but if you try and find the same for multi-winner systems, there's nothing. Here's 9 important criteria we can judge multiwinner voting systems on: 1. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 2. Independence of Universally-Approved Candidates 3. Monotonicity 4. Participation 5. Precinct-summability 6. Polynomial-time approximation scheme 7. Proportionality for solid coalitions 8. Perfect representation in the limit 9. Core-stability (may need to be approximated within a constant factor) I'm curious which combinations of these properties exist. Probabilistic/weighted voting systems are allowed. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org
…
continue reading
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Important open problems in voting, published by Closed Limelike Curves on July 2, 2024 on LessWrong. Strategy-resistance Identify, or prove impossibility, of a voting system which incentivizes 1. A strictly sincere ranking of all candidates in the zero-information setting, where it implements a "good" social choice rule such as the relative (normalized) utilitarian rule, a Condorcet social choice rule, or the Borda rule. 2. In a Poisson game or similar setting: a unique semi-sincere Nash equilibrium that elects the Condorcet winner (if one exists), similar to those shown for approval voting by Myerson and Weber (1993) and Durand et al. (2019). Properties of Multiwinner voting systems There's strikingly little research on multiwinner voting systems. You can find a table of criteria for single-winner systems on Wikipedia, but if you try and find the same for multi-winner systems, there's nothing. Here's 9 important criteria we can judge multiwinner voting systems on: 1. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 2. Independence of Universally-Approved Candidates 3. Monotonicity 4. Participation 5. Precinct-summability 6. Polynomial-time approximation scheme 7. Proportionality for solid coalitions 8. Perfect representation in the limit 9. Core-stability (may need to be approximated within a constant factor) I'm curious which combinations of these properties exist. Probabilistic/weighted voting systems are allowed. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org
1704集单集
Manage episode 426803930 series 3337129
内容由The Nonlinear Fund提供。所有播客内容(包括剧集、图形和播客描述)均由 The Nonlinear Fund 或其播客平台合作伙伴直接上传和提供。如果您认为有人在未经您许可的情况下使用您的受版权保护的作品,您可以按照此处概述的流程进行操作https://zh.player.fm/legal。
Link to original article
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Important open problems in voting, published by Closed Limelike Curves on July 2, 2024 on LessWrong. Strategy-resistance Identify, or prove impossibility, of a voting system which incentivizes 1. A strictly sincere ranking of all candidates in the zero-information setting, where it implements a "good" social choice rule such as the relative (normalized) utilitarian rule, a Condorcet social choice rule, or the Borda rule. 2. In a Poisson game or similar setting: a unique semi-sincere Nash equilibrium that elects the Condorcet winner (if one exists), similar to those shown for approval voting by Myerson and Weber (1993) and Durand et al. (2019). Properties of Multiwinner voting systems There's strikingly little research on multiwinner voting systems. You can find a table of criteria for single-winner systems on Wikipedia, but if you try and find the same for multi-winner systems, there's nothing. Here's 9 important criteria we can judge multiwinner voting systems on: 1. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 2. Independence of Universally-Approved Candidates 3. Monotonicity 4. Participation 5. Precinct-summability 6. Polynomial-time approximation scheme 7. Proportionality for solid coalitions 8. Perfect representation in the limit 9. Core-stability (may need to be approximated within a constant factor) I'm curious which combinations of these properties exist. Probabilistic/weighted voting systems are allowed. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org
…
continue reading
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Important open problems in voting, published by Closed Limelike Curves on July 2, 2024 on LessWrong. Strategy-resistance Identify, or prove impossibility, of a voting system which incentivizes 1. A strictly sincere ranking of all candidates in the zero-information setting, where it implements a "good" social choice rule such as the relative (normalized) utilitarian rule, a Condorcet social choice rule, or the Borda rule. 2. In a Poisson game or similar setting: a unique semi-sincere Nash equilibrium that elects the Condorcet winner (if one exists), similar to those shown for approval voting by Myerson and Weber (1993) and Durand et al. (2019). Properties of Multiwinner voting systems There's strikingly little research on multiwinner voting systems. You can find a table of criteria for single-winner systems on Wikipedia, but if you try and find the same for multi-winner systems, there's nothing. Here's 9 important criteria we can judge multiwinner voting systems on: 1. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 2. Independence of Universally-Approved Candidates 3. Monotonicity 4. Participation 5. Precinct-summability 6. Polynomial-time approximation scheme 7. Proportionality for solid coalitions 8. Perfect representation in the limit 9. Core-stability (may need to be approximated within a constant factor) I'm curious which combinations of these properties exist. Probabilistic/weighted voting systems are allowed. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org
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