- 154 - Pacific War Podcast - The Last Carrier Battle 28 - November 4 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Last time we spoke about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. General MacArthur's forces landed on Leyte, prompting a response from Admiral Toyoda. Kurita's 1st Striking Force was sent to attack Leyte Gulf, while Shima's force faced confusion and delays. Japanese naval forces were hit hard by American submarines, with significant losses including the sinking of the Atago and Maya. Despite efforts, Japanese counterattacks faltered. On October 24, American forces secured key positions, and MacArthur announced the re-establishment of the Philippine government amidst ongoing naval battles and air attacks. During the fierce Battle of Leyte Gulf, Musashi endured multiple torpedo and bomb hits from American aircraft but continued to fight as it took on severe flooding. Despite efforts from Kurita's fleet, Musashi was eventually abandoned and sank, marking the largest ship ever sunk by air attack. Nishimura's force faced relentless torpedo strikes and a decisive night battle, with the battleship Fuso and cruiser Mogami being heavily damaged or sunk. Ultimately, Nishimura's forces retreated, and the Americans achieved a significant victory.

This episode is the Last Carrier Battle

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Where we last left off during the Battle of Leyte Fulg, the 10th and 24th Corps had established successful beachheads at Palo-Tacloban and Dulag. In response, Admiral Toyoda launched Operation Sho-Go, mobilizing the full strength of the Imperial Japanese Navy to eliminate enemy warships and transports at sea. However, after losing three heavy cruisers to submarines, Admiral Kurita’s 1st Striking Force faced severe damage from Admiral Mitscher’s Task Force 38, culminating in the sinking of the battleship Musashi by the end of October 24. Shortly after the Sibuyan Sea engagement, Admiral Nishimura’s Force C was annihilated by Admiral Kinkaid’s 7th Fleet at the Surigao Strait. Despite these setbacks, Admiral Shima’s 2nd Striking Force was approaching the area. Meanwhile, the Americans had identified Admiral Ozawa’s decoy force by the end of the day. In response, the aggressive Admiral Halsey chose to leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded and pursue the depleted Japanese carrier force to the north, aiming to finish off the IJN. Unknown to him, Kurita, with four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and several destroyers, was advancing towards San Bernardino Strait to attack Kinkaid’s transports and escort carriers from the rear. This set the stage for one of the final and largest naval battles of the Pacific War. To the north, as the Battle of Surigao Strait was in progress, radar-equipped aircraft from the Independence detected Admiral Matsuda’s battleship carriers and later Ozawa’s carriers in the early hours of October 25. However, due to a transmission error, the location of the Japanese forces was reported inaccurately. After the rendezvous of three of Halsey’s four carrier task groups just before midnight on October 24, TF 38 headed north with every expectation of achieving a great victory. At 0100hrs on October 25, five radar-equipped aircraft flew off Independence to search out to a distance of 350NM. Contact was gained at 0205hrs on Force A and at 0235hrs on the Main Body. Because of a transmission error, the position of the Japanese forces was given incorrectly. The wrong position was plotted out some 120NM nearer to TF 38 than it actually was. In fact, TF 38 and Ozawa were actually about 210NM apart.

Despite this, Mitscher's carrier was readying for morning strikes while Admiral Lee’s Task Force 34 was being reorganized. Meanwhile, Kurita’s 1st Striking Force surprisingly navigated through San Bernardino Strait during the night without encountering resistance, proceeding towards Leyte Gulf and a confrontation with Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague’s escort carriers near Samar. However, the movement of Shima’s force was not coordinated with Nishimura’s. Shima designed his advance so he could attack separately from Nishimura’s force. The gap between the forces was originally five hours, but Shima reduced this to two hours by the time his force began entering the strait. As he entered Surigao Strait on the night of October 24/25, Nishimura issued reports during the early part of his transit, which Shima received, but when he met serious resistance, the reports stopped. Shima was therefore unaware of the virtual annihilation of Nishimura’s force. The only information available was gunfire flashes in the distance and snippets of radio traffic from Nishimura’s ships under attack. Oldendorf was aware that a second force was moving to support Nishimura. The first firm indication of this was a contact report from the PT boats on Shima’s force at 0038hrs. Oldendorf knew he was dealing with two widely spaced Japanese forces. Just as Nishimura was forced to deal with incessant PT boat attacks, now it was Shima’s turn. These turned out to be more than a mere nuisance. Shima’s introduction to combat came at about 0315hrs when PT-134 mounted an ineffective attack.

One PT boat managed to hit the cruiser Abukuma with a torpedo at 03:25, causing a significant explosion and slowing her to 10 knots, forcing her to exit Shima’s formation. As Shima advanced, he observed several ships ablaze and saw the destroyer Shigure retreat before detecting a radar contact 13,000 yards away. Without Shima’s approval, his chief of staff ordered the two cruisers to maneuver for a torpedo strike against the distant and indistinct radar contacts. At 0422hrs Nachi and Ashigara each fired eight Type 93 torpedoes at the radar contacts. In fact, these were Oldendorf’s flagship Louisville followed by Portland. Despite the element of surprise, the Japanese torpedo attack completely failed. Immediately after firing its torpedo broadside, Nachi faced disaster. The burning Mogami had loomed out of the darkness minutes before. Nachi’s skipper failed to grasp that Mogami was underway, not stationary, and he failed to take proper measures to avoid the damaged cruiser. As Nachi was unable to pass forward of Mogami, the two ships side-swiped each other forward at 04:23. Frantic last-second maneuvers lessened the impact of the collision, but the result was still dramatic. Nachi took the worst of it, suffering a large gash in her bow at the waterline on her port side. Damage to the bow reduced her speed to 18 knots. Shima’s four destroyers then continued north but failed to locate any targets. Fearing inevitable destruction, Shima decided to retreat south at 04:35. Although Oldendorf had dispatched his cruisers and destroyers to pursue the fleeing Japanese, his forces did not aggressively pursue, allowing Shima to escape.

In the end, Oldendorf’s pursuing cruisers only managed to catch the damaged Mogami and Asagumo, which they unsuccessfully attacked at 05:29. Despite sustaining additional hits, the Mogami continued to fight, escorted southwest by the destroyer Akebomo. The Asagumo, however, came under attack again at 07:02 and sank 19 minutes later. As Asagumo slipped under the waves, all that was left of Nishimura’s force were hundreds of survivors in the water. Rescue efforts by at least four American destroyers resulted in only a handful being picked up. When one of Oldendorf’s destroyer skippers asked at 07:35 what to do with the hundreds of men still in the water, Oldendorf simply replied, “Let them sink.” Japanese survivors who reached shore were, in many cases, killed by local inhabitants.

While it seemed the Mogami might escape, Sprague’s Taffy 1 group carriers launched their first strikes before 06:00. Four Avengers attacked the cruiser at 07:41 but failed to score any hits. Around 08:40, 21 aircraft also targeted Shima’s force, but only inflicted minor strafing damage on the destroyer Shiranuhi. Before Sprague could continue his air attacks, new developments were occurring off Samar as Kurita’s warships approached Rear-Admiral Clifton Sprague’s Taffy 3 group. At 06:44, a lookout from the Yamato made visual contact, though he mistakenly identified the escorting destroyers as heavy cruisers and battleships. Kurita’s initial orders increased the confusion generated by the first contact at 06:44. He ordered “General Attack” at 07:03, meaning that each ship or division proceeded on its own against the Americans. This tactic abandoned any pretense of coordination between the various elements of the 1st Striking Force. Battleships Yamato and Nagato remained together, but Kongo and Haruna operated individually. For most of the engagement, the six heavy cruisers operated in three groups of two. The two destroyer flotillas, each led by a light cruiser, were kept to the rear by Kurita. He held his destroyers back to maintain their fuel reserves by not having them maneuver at high speeds, instead sending his heavy cruisers ahead to pursue at full speed. This precluded them from screening the heavy ships and kept them out of position to make a torpedo attack. The General Attack decision was a critical error. It resulted in a loss of control by Kurita and a melee for the next two hours. His rationale for ordering an immediate, but uncoordinated, attack was to close the range as quickly as possible and knock out the carriers’ flight decks. Throughout the battle, Kurita maneuvered to keep the weather gauge; by so doing, he could prevent the carriers from turning into the wind to conduct flight operations. Meanwhile, an Avenger from Kadashan Bay sighted Kurita’s force at 06:47 following radar contacts. Despite his surprise, Sprague immediately ordered Taffy 3 to head east, increased speed to 17.5 knots, directed every ship to lay smoke, and launched all available aircraft at 06:55. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Sprague began sending clear text messages at 07:01 to report his predicament and request assistance.

Sprague's main objective was to delay the Japanese forces until reinforcements could arrive. To achieve this, he decided to use smoke screens and continuous air assaults, supported by Taffy 2’s aircraft, to hinder Kurita’s ships. As Kurita’s cruisers advanced north, Sprague opted to maneuver southwest, moving closer to Leyte Gulf and the potential assistance from the 7th Fleet. Starting at 06:59, Kurita’s battleships began firing from long range, with their salvos becoming more frequent and accurate. To mitigate this pressure, Sprague directed his forces into a rain squall from 07:06 to 07:15. Once clear of the squall, he changed course southward towards the approaching help from Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, as Kurita’s ships continued east before turning south, the range of Sprague’s carriers was extended, and the rain and smoke impaired the accuracy of the Japanese gunners. Sprague also ordered his three destroyers to launch a torpedo counterattack to shield the escort carriers as they emerged from the squall. The Johnston, charging through enemy fire, engaged the cruiser Kumano with gunfire to close the distance for a torpedo attack. At 10,000 yards, the Johnston fired all ten of its torpedoes, scoring a critical hit that slowed the cruiser and forced it to retreat. It was inevitable that Evans would pay a price for approaching so close to a collection of enemy cruisers and battleships. This came at 0730hrs in the form of three large shells (possibly fired from Yamato) and a number of smaller shells that struck Johnston. The armor-piercing shells failed to explode, but damage was extensive. The aft machinery room was destroyed, which reduced speed to 17 knots. Most of the 5in./38 guns were knocked out, but after repairs were made during a providential 10-minute respite as a squall passed over, three were brought back online. The battleship evaded the torpedoes at 07:33 and retaliated with devastating gunfire against the Hoel.

By 07:30, all operational aircraft were airborne, prompting Sprague to order the initial attacks on the heavy cruisers approaching his port quarter. Unrelenting American air attacks were the main reason for the Japanese defeat. Taffy aircrews were not highly trained for maritime attack, and torpedoes or armor-piercing bombs were in short supply. Most Avengers were launched with bombs instead of more effective torpedoes for two reasons. Torpedoes took more time and preparation to load, and the deck crews on Taffy 3 did not have the luxury of time. Also, once loaded with a heavy torpedo, the Avengers could only be launched if the escort carrier steamed into the wind. Moving downwind, like Taffy 3 was forced to do for most of the action, did not get enough wind across the flight deck. The first attacks by Taffy 3 aircraft were conducted in groups of two or three with aircraft not properly armed for attacking ships. Because Taffy 3 could not steam into the wind while being pursued by Kurita’s force, recovering aircraft during the battle was impossible. When they ran out of ordnance or fuel, they had to land on Taffy 2 or fly 100NM to the newly opened airfield at Tacloban. Even when lightly armed or unevenly unarmed, the aircraft made unceasing strafing runs in the case of the Wildcats or dummy bombing runs in the case of the Avengers. These attacks were poorly coordinated, but the Japanese, on the receiving end of incessant attacks, saw it differently. After the battle, Kurita and others commented that the attacks were well coordinated, skillful, and aggressive.

At 07:35, ten Avengers struck the cruiser Suzuya just as Vice-Admiral Shiraishi Kazutaka was boarding, scoring a near miss that reduced her speed to 20 knots and took her out of the battle. The damaged Hoel then attempted a second torpedo attack on the heavy cruiser Haguro at 07:50 but failed to hit the target. However, this attack forced the Superbattleship Yamato to open fire at 0659hrs. Her third salvo straddled White Plains, with one of the shells striking the carrier and causing some underwater damage. Around 0800hrs, to evade torpedoes fired from Hoel aimed at Haguro, Yamato turned due north. This evasive maneuver forced her to the north for almost ten minutes until the torpedo tracks disappeared, placing her at the rear of Kurita’s formation and effectively removing her from the battle for a period. Nagato opened fire at 0701hrs at a carrier assessed to be 36,000 yards away. After the three salvos, the battleship stopped firing having hit nothing.

At 07:54, the Heermann launched seven torpedoes at Haguro, but they missed. Destroyer escorts Samuel B. Roberts, Raymond, and Dennis also joined in the attack but also failed to score hits, though they managed to escape unharmed. The Heermann subsequently launched a second torpedo attack on the Haruna at 08:00, but once again, none of the torpedoes hit their mark. Despite using smoke and evading shell splashes, the Heermann avoided damage. The first ship to succumb to the barrage of Japanese shellfire was the crippled Hoel. After her run against Haguro, and only able to make 17 knots, she was trapped between Kongo on one side and four heavy cruisers on the other. Using every possible method to evade the storm of shells directed against his ship, Kintberger survived for well over an hour after the first hit was recorded. Hoel took as many as 23 hits, but the actual number will never be known since most passed through the ship without exploding. The final engine was knocked out at 0830hrs, bringing the ship to a halt. As the crew abandoned ship under continued fire, the Hoel finally rolled over at 08:55. Meanwhile, the Japanese cruisers continued to close in on the escort carriers. Under fire from the battleships, Sprague’s initial course was to the eastsoutheast at full speed—17.5 knots. As the Japanese heavy cruisers began to pressure his formation’s port quarter, Sprague was forced to alter course to the southwest. Kalinin Bay was at the rear of the formation. She took a battleship shell at 0750hrs (probably from Haruna) that went through the hangar deck and out of her unarmored hull. As many as 14 other hits followed, all probably from 8in. shells. Kalinin Bay retaliated against the cruisers at 18,000 yards with her aft 5in./38 gun. The smoke generated from all six carriers and from the destroyers and destroyer escorts on their starboard quarter succeeded in hiding the carriers from direct Japanese observation for much of the battle. The Japanese shot slowly and methodically with four-gun salvos, allowing the escort carriers to chase salvos. The smoke and evasive maneuvering kept damage to a minimum, but of the six escort carriers, four were eventually hit. Fanshaw Bay took six 8in. hits, all forward, that killed three and wounded 20. White Plains took a probable 6in. hit and suffered light damage. Kitkun Bay was not hit but suffered several personnel casualties from near misses. St. Lo suffered no damage during the battle.

The Gambier Bay bore the brunt of enemy fire, with an initial shell igniting a fire at 08:10. Ten minutes later, a devastating hit reduced her speed to 11 knots and forced the carrier to lag behind the rest of the formation. At 08:22, Yamato reentered the fray, intensifying the assault on the carrier. Heermann closed on the carrier at 0841hrs to find her burning and listing 20°. Continued Japanese fire resulted in more hits, with most of the armor-piercing shells passing through the ship. Hit by as many as 26 shells from Yamato, Haruna, and several cruisers, Gambier Bay went dead in the water at 0845hrs; five minutes later, the captain gave the order to abandon ship. Gambier Bay capsized at 0907hrs, one of only two carriers sunk by gunfire during the entire war.

Meanwhile, at 08:26, Sprague ordered the destroyer escorts on the starboard side of the formation to position themselves between the carriers and the Japanese heavy cruisers on their port side. As John C. Butler and Dennis engaged the enemy cruisers, the latter sustained minor damage from two hits. Samuel B. Roberts also was struck at 0850hrs. At 0900hrs, the destroyer escort was hit by two or three 14in. shells from Kongo. The large shells tore a huge hole in the side of the ship and knocked out all power. A total of six shells hit the ship. This prompted an order to abandon ship at 0910hrs for the crew of 178. Half (89 of them) did not survive. Samuel B. Roberts sank at 1005hrs.

During this time, Rear-Admiral Kimura Masatomi instructed his destroyers to launch a torpedo attack at 08:45, targeting Kalinin Bay. Fortunately, Johnston detected the new threat and made a daring suicide charge through the smoke. Evans engaged Yahagi with gunfire at 7,000 yards, and several hits were gained. Then Evans engaged the next destroyer in column, again claiming several hits. Kimura ordered his torpedoes fired from about 10,500 yards—not an ideal range for even the formidable Type 93. Yahagi launched seven torpedoes at 0905hrs, followed by three destroyers beginning at 0915hrs, Urakaze fired four, Isokaze eight, and Yukikaze four. Evans may have been responsible for Kimura’s premature torpedo attack, but now his ship was about to pay the ultimate price. The Japanese destroyers and Yahagi took Johnston under fire, joined by as many as three heavy cruisers. The hits began to pile up. By 0920hrs, Evans was reduced to conning the ship by yelling orders through an open hatch on the fantail to men below turning the rudder manually. At 0945hrs, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. The Japanese destroyers closed in and continued to pound the wreck. After an epic fight, Johnston rolled over and sank at 1010hrs. Most of the crew of 327 got into the water, but 186, including Evans, were lost. Meanwhile, Rear-Admiral Felix Stump’s Taffy 2 group began their strikes against Kurita’s fleet, with 15 Avengers and 20 Wildcats successfully hitting the Haguro with a bomb at 08:25.

Five minutes later, six Avengers and 20 Wildcats from Taffy 3 joined forces with 16 Avengers and 8 Wildcats from Taffy 2 to launch a major assault on the enemy cruisers. At 08:50, the Chokai was attacked, and by 09:05, it had sustained severe damage from a bomb hit. The destroyer Fujinami arrived to assist at 10:18, but by then, the cruiser was immobilized. The destroyer evacuated the crew and sank the Chokai with torpedoes. At 08:54, four Avengers targeted the Chikuma, landing a critical torpedo hit that caused significant flooding. With American aircraft focusing on the Japanese warships, Kurita decided to withdraw at 09:11, planning to regroup and return to Leyte Gulf. Another attack against Suzuya was mounted at 1050hrs by as many as 30 aircraft. This time, a near miss amidships turned deadly. Shrapnel from the bomb ignited the torpedoes in the starboard forward mount, igniting a fire that caused other torpedoes to explode at 1100hrs. The explosion caused extensive damage to the secondary battery and the machinery, which left the ship unmaneuverable. For a second time in the morning, Vice Admiral Shiraishi had to transfer, this time to Tone. The fires reached the remaining torpedoes, with a large explosion resulting at 1200hrs. In turn, this caused the magazine of the secondary battery to explode, and soon the entire ship was an inferno. Surviving crewmen were taken off by destroyer Okinami after the order to abandon ship was given at 1300hrs, and at 1320hrs Suzuya sank. Twohundred forty-seven men were lost. The Tone suffered a bomb hit at 12:40, and three minutes later, Noshiro experienced minor damage from near misses. The destroyer Nowaki was tasked with rescuing Chikuma’s crew and then scuttling the crippled cruiser, which was completed by 11:00. Due to these air attacks and fearing total destruction if the battle continued, Kurita signaled Toyoda at 12:36 to abandon the attack on Leyte Gulf and began his retreat north. During this withdrawal, Kurita’s force faced attacks from 37 Avengers and 19 Wildcats at 12:45, resulting in only minor damage to Nagato and Tone. Subsequent strikes by Stump’s carriers were also ineffective, but Sprague’s carriers' total of 441 sorties that day was a notable accomplishment.

At 13:15, 100 aircraft from Admiral McCain’s carrier, which had been recalled on October 24 and were now arriving in the area, launched one of the longest carrier strikes of the war. Despite their efforts, they were unable to inflict additional damage. A follow-up strike at 15:00 with 52 planes also failed, allowing Kurita to escape. Tremendously outgunned, the commander of Taffy 3, Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, began to plead for help minutes into the battle. As Kurita pressed his advantage, these pleas became more urgent. In response, Oldendorf recalled his advance guard at 0723hrs. Kinkaid ordered Oldendorf to bring his entire force north at 0847hrs to assist the escort carriers. He formed a task force of the battleships California, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania, because they had the most armor-piercing shells remaining. They were escorted by three heavy cruisers and 20 destroyers with 165 torpedoes. The next strike consisting of ten Avengers, each with two 500lb bombs instead of torpedoes, escorted by five Wildcats, all from Ommaney Bay, went after Mogami. The Avenger pilots claimed five hits on the cruiser; in fact, only two bombs struck the ship. By the time the attack concluded at 0910hrs, Mogami was dead in the water after the failure of her last turbine. New fires raged beyond control and the danger of the forward 8in. magazine exploding (the others had been flooded) put the entire crew in danger. After evacuating the remaining crew, the Akebono scuttled Mogami at 13:07, resulting in the loss of 191 men.

Additionally, in the morning, Taffy 1 faced Admiral Onishi’s first kamikaze attack. The first ship to be attacked was Santee. At 0740hrs, a kamikaze commenced its dive, gained complete surprise, and encountered no antiaircraft fire before hitting the ship forward on the flight deck. Fires from the resulting explosion were quickly put out, but not before 43 men had been killed or wounded. Within five minutes of the fires being extinguished, submarine I-56 slammed a torpedo into the ship. The converted tanker shook it off with no casualties and no loss of capability. The final aircraft also selected Petrof Bay but ended up going after Suwannee after it was damaged by antiaircraft fire. It struck the carrier on the flight deck forward of the aft aircraft elevator. The Zero’s 551lb bomb exploded, creating a hole on the hangar deck. The fires were put out within minutes, and within two hours flight operations had resumed. The suicide pilots approached the remaining five escort carriers at low level before popping up to altitude a few miles from their target. At this point they were detected on radar, but no interception by defending Wildcats was possible. At 1049hrs, Kitkun Bay was attacked by a single Zero. The pilot failed to hit the carrier’s bridge, but his aircraft hit the port-side catwalk before crashing into the sea. The ship incurred damage when the Zero’s bomb exploded close alongside. Two more suicide aircraft were dispatched by antiaircraft fire. The last two Zeros selected White Plains for their attentions. One came in from astern but missed the ship after crashing into the water close aboard the port side. The other was deterred by antiaircraft fire and headed toward St. Lo. The last kamikaze was the most skillful. At 1053hrs, the Zero came in over the stern of St. Lo and dropped his bomb before performing a shallow dive into the flight deck amidships. The aircraft slid off the bow, leaving a trail of fire on the flight deck from its fuel. The fire was no problem to deal with, but the bomb penetrated the flight deck and exploded in the hangar deck, where six aircraft were being fueled and armed. The resulting explosion forced the ship to be abandoned, and 32 minutes after being struck, the ship sank with 114 crewmen after the fires reached its magazines. St. Lo was the first ship sunk by kamikaze attack. At 1110hrs, another four kamikazes appeared and selected Kalinin Bay for attack. Two were shot down by antiaircraft fire. The other pair both scored glancing hits. One Zero was hit by antiaircraft fire, remained in control, and then hit the flight deck at a shallow angle and slid overboard. The second hit the ship with a glancing blow aft.

Looking north, despite losing contact with Ozawa’s force overnight, Mitscher decided to launch an initial strike of 130 aircraft, led by Commander McCampbell, by 06:00. At the same time, he dispatched search aircraft, which reestablished contact with Ozawa’s now reunited Main Body at 07:10. The American strike was then directed toward the enemy, and McCampbell’s planes successfully located Ozawa’s carriers at 08:10, beginning their assault. Despite encountering 13 Zeros on combat air patrol, the Helldivers struck first at 08:30, targeting the enemy carriers. They were followed by strafing Hellcats and torpedo-armed Avengers. The hour-long attack resulted in significant damage: Zuikaku was hit by three bombs and one torpedo, leading to fires, flooding, and a severe list; Zuiho sustained a single bomb hit causing fires on the hangar deck; Chitose was heavily damaged by three near misses that ruptured its unarmored hull, causing flooding and a severe list, and it sank at 09:37 with 904 casualties; the light cruiser Tama was torpedoed and had to make its way to Okinawa for repairs; the cruiser Oyodo suffered light damage from a bomb hit; and the destroyer Akizuki was hit amidships, caught fire, and broke apart before sinking following a major explosion. As this attack unfolded, Mitscher launched a second wave of 36 aircraft, which arrived at the target area around 09:45. Under McCampbell’s coordination, these planes focused on the carrier Chiyoda, which was hit by one bomb and several damaging near misses that caused flooding and a list, ultimately bringing the carrier to a halt.

Simultaneously, he deployed search aircraft, which reestablished contact with Ozawa’s now reunited Main Body at 07:10. With the American strike directed towards this position, McCampbell’s planes successfully located the enemy at 08:10 and began their assault on Ozawa’s carriers. The Japanese were aware of the impending arrival of the initial strike, since radar aboard Zuikaku had detected the American aircraft at 08:04 about 110NM to the southwest. Four Zeros were already on CAP; these were joined by the last nine fighters on Zuikaku. Such a meager CAP meant that survival of Ozawa’s ships depended on their ability to throw up accurate anti-aircraft fire and maneuver adeptly under dive-bombing and torpedo attack. According to American pilots, Japanese anti-aircraft fire was heavy and began with a display of multi-colored explosions at 15NM out as Ise and Hyuga fired sanshiki-dan incendiary shells from their 14in. main battery. The small Japanese CAP raced toward the approaching American formation, but the escorting Hellcats prevented them from reaching the Helldivers or Avengers. Essex Hellcats claimed nine Zeros, but one Hellcat was shot down and its pilot left in the water to witness the unfolding attack; he was rescued after the battle.

The Helldivers launched the initial attack on the enemy carriers at 08:30, followed by strafing runs from Hellcats and then torpedo attacks from Avengers. Zuikaku came under attack from dive-bombers and torpedo bombers from Intrepid, and two light carriers. Five minutes into the attack, Zuikaku was hit by three bombs amidships, which created a fire on the lower and upper hangar decks. Just minutes later, a torpedo launched by an Avenger from either Intrepid or San Jacinto struck the ship on her port side. One of the engine rooms was flooded, and one of the shafts was damaged and had to be shut down. The ensuing flooding caused a severe list, but this was quickly corrected to a manageable 6°. The veteran carrier had an experienced and capable damage-control team. By 0850hrs, the fires were extinguished, and 23 knots were restored using the starboard shafts. However, steering was uneven, and the ship’s transmitters were out of commission. Since she was no longer suitable as a flagship, plans were made to transfer Ozawa and his staff to cruiser Oyodo. Before this could happen, the second strike showed up.

Zuiho was caught out of formation launching aircraft when the first attack began. Enterprise’s strike group targeted the veteran light carrier known to her crew as a lucky ship, since she had survived three earlier carrier battles. Reports from Enterprise air crew stated that the carrier was left dead in the water and on fire. In exchange, one Enterprise Avenger was seriously damaged by antiaircraft fire and was rolled over the side of the carrier when it landed back onboard. Another Enterprise Hellcat was lost to Zero attack. Intrepid Helldivers also selected Zuiho for attack and claimed hits. In fact, Zuiho suffered three near misses followed by a direct bomb hit at 0835hrs. The explosion caused fires on the hangar deck, but these were out by 0855hrs. After the dive-bombers did their work, torpedo bombers from Essex and Lexington attacked Zuiho, but no hits were gained.

Light carrier Chitose was crippled early and was the first of Ozawa’s carriers to sink. At 0835hrs, she was attacked by dive-bombers from Essex and Lexington. Helldivers from Essex reported dropping 12 bombs and claimed 8 hits, leaving the carrier burning and listing. In fact, Chitose suffered three near misses along her port side. This was enough to rupture the carrier’s unarmored hull. The resulting flooding knocked out two boiler rooms and caused a severe 27° list. Damage-control efforts reduced the list and kept power, but steering was only accomplished by using the engines. At 0915hrs, progressive flooding knocked out the starboard engine room and speed fell below 14 knots. Ten minutes later, flooding caused all power to be lost and the list increased to a dangerous 30°. Hyuga was directed to tow the carrier, but her condition was beyond salvage. Chitose sank at 0937hrs with the loss of 904 officers and men; another 601 were saved. Light cruiser Tama was attacked by torpedo bombers from Belleau Wood and San Jacinto. One torpedo hit the ship in her boiler room. After emergency repairs, the cruiser was ordered to proceed independently to Okinawa at her best speed of 14 knots.

Oyodo was also subjected to attack and was slightly damaged. At 0848hrs, she was struck by a bomb and two rockets and recorded near misses from bombs. The cruiser’s speed was unimpaired. Large destroyer Akizuki also came under attack from aircraft in the first strike. At 0842hrs the ship was struck amidships and set afire. The ship lost power and fell out of formation. Within minutes, a large explosion was noted amidships and at 0856hrs Akizuki broke in two and quickly sank. The cause was either a torpedo or a bomb hit that detonated torpedoes in the amidships torpedo mount. The commanding officer and 150 officers and men were pulled out of the water before more air attacks forced destroyer Maki to abandon rescue operations. Meanwhile, as this attack unfolded, Mitscher launched a second strike of 36 aircraft, which reached the target area around 09:45. Coordinated by McCampbell, these planes focused on the carrier Chiyoda, which was hit by one bomb and several near misses, resulting in flooding and a severe list, ultimately bringing the carrier to a halt.

The climax of Halsey’s battle of annihilation against the Main Body should have been an engagement by Task Force 34 with six of the world’s most powerful battleships. But this was never to be. The plight of the escort carriers off Samar brought a flurry of urgent pleas to Halsey for assistance. These began at 07:07 with a plain text message from Kinkaid. In response, Halsey ordered Task Group 38.1 to steam west from Ulithi to support Kinkaid, but otherwise remained focused on crushing Ozawa with the rest of Task Force 38. This changed when Nimitz weighed in at 10:00 with an inquiry on the location of Admiral Lee’s battleships, which finally prompted Halsey to order Task Force 34, supported by Task Group 38.2, south at 10:15. At this point, Task Force 34 was some 42NM away from Ozawa’s remnants. This order was executed at 11:15 when the battleships turned south, yet the change of orders came too late. Even at their best speed, the battle line could not arrive off San Bernardino Strait until about 01:00 on October 26. At 13:45, Task Force 34 also slowed from 20 to 12 knots to fuel destroyers, something that took until 16:22.

By noon, as Ozawa transferred to the Oyodo, Mitscher launched his third strike. Launched between 1145hrs and1200hrs, the third strike was the largest and most effective of the day. It was active over the target area from about 1310hrs to 1400hrs with some 200 aircraft, 75 percent of which had taken part in the initial strike in the morning. The strike coordinator was Commander T. Hugh Winters from Lexington. By this point, the Main Body’s formation was in a shambles. Two carriers were located to the north with a battleship and what was reported as two cruisers. Another carrier was located some 20NM to the south on fire and listing. A second battleship, a cruiser, and a destroyer were nearby the crippled carrier. Winters ordered TG 38.3’s 98 aircraft from Essex, Lexington, and Langley, to go after the two operational carriers. Aircraft from Lexington focused on Zuikaku. By 1100hrs, Ozawa had departed his flagship and transferred to Oyodo. The nine surviving Zeros on CAP were forced to ditch around 1030hrs, so for the rest of the day the Americans faced no air opposition. Zuikaku worked up to 24 knots shortly after the third strike was spotted at 1308hrs. The attack by Helldivers and Avengers was well coordinated, with the Avengers coming in from both bows in an anvil attack. In less than ten minutes, Zuikaku was subjected to six torpedo hits—two on the starboard side and four on the port side. The first was a hit at 1315hrs that failed to detonate. The last of the six hit at 1323hrs. Within minutes of the last torpedo hit, the mighty carrier was listing to port by 14° and was dead in the water after all power was lost. In addition to the torpedoes, four bombs hit the ship, which resulted in renewed fires on the hangar decks. At 1327, with the list increasing to 21°, the crew was ordered up to the flight deck. The captain gave a final address and then the ensign was lowered. Finally, after this touch of the dramatic, the crew was ordered to abandon ship at 1358hrs. The ship rolled over at 1414hrs and took the captain, 48 other officers, and 794 enlisted men with her. Essex’s strike focused on Zuiho. When aircraft from TG 38.4 arrived, including Enterprise’s second strike of six Hellcats, ten Helldivers, and five Avengers, most were also directed at Zuiho at 1310hrs followed by more at 1330hrs. At 1317hrs, the carrier was hit by one torpedo on her starboard quarter. According to Japanese accounts, one small bomb hit the aft elevator, followed by seven very close near misses, and then 60 more near misses. Bomb fragments caused flooding in the starboard engine room and created a 13° list.

Mitscher’s fourth strike, launched around 13:15 and reaching the target area by 14:45, involved 40 aircraft but only achieved ten near misses on the Zuiho and four near misses on the battleship Ise. Despite this, the Zuiho ultimately sank at 15:26, with 215 men lost. At 16:10, Mitscher launched his fifth strike, while a strong surface force under Rear-Admiral Laurance DuBose closed in on Chiyoda to finish her off. DuBose’s force first encountered Chiyoda dead in the water with light cruiser Isuzu nearby preparing to rescue survivors. Isuzu quickly fled, leaving the heavy cruisers to open fire at Chiyoda at 1624hrs from some 20,000 yards. The carrier responded with her 5in. dual-purpose guns, but against a stationary target the American cruiser scored quickly and often and after 15 minutes the carrier was a mass of flames. A towering column of black smoke marked Chiyoda’s final moments. At 1655hrs, the carrier rolled over—there were no survivors from her crew of 970 men.

Between 17:10 and 17:40, the fifth strike, consisting of 85 aircraft, targeted the Ise. However, due to pilot fatigue, only one bomb hit the battleship, with 34 near misses causing minor flooding. The sister ship, Hyuga, which was positioned south of the Main Body, experienced seven near misses but no direct hits. Mitscher then launched a final strike of 36 aircraft at 17:10, which reached the target area about an hour later but failed to cause further damage. Overall, Task Force 38 executed 527 sorties against Ozawa’s force that day, marking the most intense effort by fast carriers against naval targets up to that point. Despite the lack of significant air opposition and heavy but largely ineffective anti-aircraft fire, the results were underwhelming. The limited damage can be attributed to heavy anti-aircraft fire, effective ship maneuvering, and pilot fatigue from previous attacks on the Sibuyan Sea. The Battle off Cape Engaño was not over yet. As DuBose’s mop-up force continued north, they encountered three destroyers rescuing survivors from Zuikaku and Zuiho. At 18:52, DuBose’s light cruisers engaged the Hatsuzuki, which tried to resist but was ultimately destroyed by the intense gunfire, sinking at 20:59. DuBose ceased his pursuit at 21:30. This decision was timely, as Hatsuzuki’s distress calls led Ozawa to advance south with three battleships and one destroyer at 20:41. Finding no targets, Ozawa turned back at 23:30, bringing the battle to an end.

On his retreat, two wolf packs were lying in wait. Although Ise avoided significant damage from a powerful torpedo attack at 18:44, the Tama, already damaged, wasn't as fortunate. The cruiser was proceeding independently to Okinawa at 14 knots after taking a torpedo in the first air attack. Jallao’s skipper fired three torpedoes from her bow tubes, but they all missed. He quickly lined up another shot with the four stern tubes. Three of the four hit, and two exploded. The damage was catastrophic, causing Tama to break in two and quickly sink. There were no survivors from the crew of some 450 men.

Meanwhile, Halsey had dispatched the fastest ships from his battle line at 16:22 in a last-ditch effort to intercept Kurita’s force before it could navigate the San Bernardino Strait. However, they arrived too late, as aircraft from Independence detected Kurita’s force moving through the strait at 21:40. The only ship that did not make it was the destroyer Nowaki, which, overloaded with survivors from Chikuma, was attacked by the American forces at 00:54 on October 26 and was swiftly sunk by 01:32. During this time, General Krueger’s offensive persisted with General Sibert’s 10th Corps and General Hodge’s 24th Corps making steady progress inland. To the north, cavalry units secured San Juanico Strait, while Colonel Newman’s 3rd Battalion captured Hill C and Colonel Chapman’s 2nd Battalion took Hill B despite heavy resistance. Additionally, Chapman’s 1st Battalion secured Hill 85, and the majority of the 3rd Battalion advanced towards Castilla, 8000 yards southwest of Palo. Further south, a patrol from the 383rd Regiment reached the Binahaan River and linked up with Chapman’s Company K; the 382nd Regiment pushed beyond Aslom and Kanmonhag; Colonel May’s Company K attempted, but failed, to capture Tabontabon; the 17th and 184th Regiments consolidated their newly captured positions on Burauen while sending patrols towards Dagami; and the 32nd Regiment made some headway toward the Buri airstrip but was still unable to capture it.

By October 26, Shima’s two heavy cruisers and two destroyers had successfully evaded several PT boat attacks and made their escape. However, the damaged cruiser Abukuma, under the protection of destroyer Ushio, was struck by 43 B-24 heavy bombers in the Sulu Sea. Usually high-altitude attacks on ships were totally ineffective, so the bombers came in at an altitude of about 6,500ft. In the first attack, Abukuma took a direct hit in the area of her bridge at 1006hrs and another aft. The second group of bombers scored a damaging near miss forward, and then a direct hit aft that knocked out one of the shafts and the steering equipment. The resulting fires spread to the engine rooms and the torpedo mounts located aft. When the fires reached the torpedoes, four exploded at 1037hrs. A third attack at 1044hrs brought only near misses. Abukuma was mortally damaged but remained afloat long enough for 284 of the crew to leave the ship. The veteran cruiser, part of the force that attacked Pearl Harbor, sank at 1242hrs with the loss of 220 men (added to the loss of 37 from the torpedo hit from the PT boat). As they came in at a lower altitude, Abukuma and Ushio were able to account for three bombers in this action.

On the same day, kamikaze attacks resumed against Taffy 1. Three Zeros penetrated the CAP and attacked Suwannee, which had completed repairs from the prior day’s suicide attack. One Zero hit the flight deck and smashed into a group of ten aircraft parked on the bow. The aircraft were quickly engulfed in flames that spread down into the hangar bay, where another ten fueled aircraft were preparing to be brought up to the flight deck. The resulting fires on the hangar deck were put out, followed two hours later by the fire on the flight deck. The crew paid a high price for saving their ship— 85 dead, 58 missing, and 102 wounded. Other kamikazes selected Sangamon and Petrof Bay for attack; both carriers reported being near-missed.

The initial success of the kamikaze attacks, including one carrier sunk and five damaged, gave the Japanese hope that they had found a way to halt the American naval advance. This marked the beginning of the Kamikaze era in the Pacific War. As Kurita’s force moved through the Sibuyan Sea, Admirals McCain and Bogan launched a strike at 06:00 with 257 aircraft. Despite this effort, the exhausted pilots managed only three bomb hits on Kumano, causing moderate damage. Aircraft from Wasp and Cowpens also found Kurita’s main force. Noshiro was able to evade six torpedoes aimed at her, but at 0852hrs one struck with devastating effect. The ship lost all power and within minutes developed a 26° list to port. The next attack was conducted by aircraft from Hornet. A second torpedo hit the lightly protected cruiser at 1039hrs, and at 1113hrs she sank bow first. By this point, Kurita’s destroyers were down to their last few tons of fuel, forcing them to reduce speed. Destroyers had to shift fuel among themselves to reach a tanker positioned at Coron Bay. Hayashimo was forced to temporarily anchor off Semirara Island south of Mindoro. She was attacked by Avengers from 1045hrs to 1050hrs, and had her bow blown off by a torpedo. As a result, she was grounded and sank in shallow water off Semirara Island. Kurita’s remaining ships managed to reach Coron Bay or Brunei, except for the destroyers Fujinami and Shiranui, which were sunk by air attacks on October 27, resulting in the loss of their crews, including those from Chokai aboard Fujinami. By the end of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the IJN had been effectively decimated.

Despite suffering a severe defeat, Admiral Mikawa assessed that he still had enough resources to carry out Operation TA, which involved transporting reinforcements to Ormoc. On October 24, the cruiser Kinu and the destroyer Uranami escorted five transports through intense strafing fire to Cagayan. After boarding the 41st Regiment, Admiral Sakonju’s convoy set sail the next morning and successfully landed the reinforcements at Ormoc early on October 26. Although they faced occasional enemy air attacks, they did not incur significant troop losses. Sakonju then sent three transports to Manila, but these were targeted by aircraft from Sprague’s carriers. The attacks resulted in two bomb hits on Uranami and three on Kinu, leading to the sinking of both ships in the Visayan Sea. Another transport proceeded to Bohol, embarked the 169th Independent Battalion, and landed them at Ormoc on October 27. Although the Leyte beachheads were secured against sea-based attacks, the Americans could not control all surrounding waters, allowing Generals Yamashita and Suzuki to continue reinforcing the island. This marks the conclusion of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In exchange for the loss of one light carrier, two escort carriers, two destroyers, one destroyer escort, one submarine, one PT boat, 255 aircraft, and about 2,000 men, the Americans had destroyed approximately 300 enemy planes and sunk 28 warships, including the carrier Zuikaku (the last survivor of the Pearl Harbor attack), three light carriers, three battleships, ten cruisers, and eleven destroyers, with a total of 12,000 Japanese casualties.

Despite losing all his carriers, Ozawa fulfilled his expected role and managed to survive the battle with two battleships and two cruisers. After the war, he noted that the final three strikes were not damaging, and his chief of staff remarked that he was unimpressed with the American pilots' quality. In contrast, Halsey faced severe criticism for his controversial decision to leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded while moving his entire force north. If he had employed more strategic thinking and embraced decentralized decision-making, Mitscher’s carriers could have engaged and defeated both Ozawa and Kurita. Nishimura also performed his duties effectively; despite losing his life and almost his entire force, he diverted the 7th Fleet’s surface forces, leaving Kinkaid’s transports and escort carriers vulnerable to Kurita’s attack. The Shima force contributed nothing to the mission but survived largely intact. Kurita demonstrated bravery throughout the battle but was occasionally indecisive. Although he was not responsible for the losses at the Sibuyan Sea and was unlucky with his lookouts misidentifying cruisers and battleships among Sprague’s escort carriers, he faced American tactics that he perceived as skillful. Sprague’s desperate maneuvers to avoid annihilation were seen by the Japanese as tactical excellence. Kurita acknowledged the effective performance of American destroyers, which broke up his formation with torpedo attacks and utilized smoke screens effectively. Both Kurita and his chief of staff found the American air attacks to be relentless, aggressive, skillful, and well-coordinated, considering them the most proficient attacks encountered by the 1st Striking Force throughout the battle.

In the end, Toyoda’s Sho-Go plan was fundamentally flawed and destined for failure. Although it contained some clever elements that exploited weaknesses in the US Navy’s command structure, it was ultimately incapable of success and served only as a means of the IJN’s destruction. Even if Kurita had advanced into Leyte Gulf, it would have provided no significant military advantage for the Japanese and would likely have led to the complete destruction of Kurita’s forces. The failure of Sho-Go left the Japanese without a fleet and with no realistic hope of defeating the Americans. However, the emergence of Kamikaze attacks allowed Japan to continue the war for a while longer.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

The Imperial Japanese Navy was virtually annihilated during the battle of Leyte Gulf. Few of her mighty warships remained and now she would cling to desperate measures to try and force the Americans to sue for an early peace to retain pieces of her empire. How long could Japan drag this war on?